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THE CHIMERA AND THE COP:
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION LAW
Michael M. Hethmon*
lobates sent Bellerophon away with orders to kill the Chimera that none
might approach; a thing of immortal make, not human, lion-fronted and
snake behind, a goat in the middle, and snorting out the breath of the terrible
flame of bright fire.

-Homer,

Iliad 6.179-182.

INTRODUCTION

The questions of if, when, and how local police can enforce federal immigra-

tion laws go to the heart of the legal hunt for the chimera that is contemporary
American immigration law.1 In the opening years of this century, the estimated
illegal alien population in the United States has reached historic levels. The na-

tional response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed what had been
largely a municipal conflict between ethnic organizations, the immigration bar,
and local governments in high-immigration jurisdictions into a much larger national debate about national security, civil liberties, and federalism. z After the
devastating attacks on the United States, the public demanded a wide-ranging
response.3

Congress believed that terrorists were able to enter the United States undetected, to violate the terms of their admission with impunity, and to move freely
within our borders without interference from law enforcement officers. As a legislative response, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act,4 the Homeland Se* Staff Attorney, Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). J.D., University of
Maryland School of Law, M.I.M., Thunderbird Graduate School of International Management, B.A.,
UCLA. The author thanks Dan Stein, Jack Martin, James Dorsey, and Owen Burnett for their advice
and comments.
1 A chimera is a mythical monster compounded of incongruous parts.
2 See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizingthe Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries
of the Post-September l1th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004).
3 MUZAFFAR A. CHISTI, DORIS MEISSNER, DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU, JAY PETERZELL,
MICHAEL J. WISHNIE & STEPHEN W. YALE-LOEHR, AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY,
CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER 9-11, Migration Policy Institute (2003) [hereinafter
CHRISTI ET AL. AMERICA'S CHALLENGE].
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26,

2001).
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curity Act,5 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act.6 A
common goal of these three measures was to improve federal and local cooperative efforts to detect and detain aliens participating in terrorist activities in the
United States.
The introduction during the 108th Congress of bills and presidential proposals
to manage the illegal immigration crisis through a combination of amnesty and
expanded guest worker programs has further raised public awareness of the extent to which local law enforcement has been impacted by the presence of rapidly
expanding populations of illegal aliens.
The primary goal of this article is to identify and describe the current state of
law, from a perspective that is supportive of enhanced cooperative enforcement
of immigration law at the federal and local levels. A secondary objective is to
discuss questions about the viability of local enforcement initiatives that have
been raised by the immigration bar and federal law enforcement agents.
Part I begins with a defense of the doctrine of the inherent authority of local
police to enforce federal immigration law, and a critique of the opposing doctrine
of local non-cooperation. Part II summarizes current law of interest to local and
state law enforcement agencies that seek to support the enforcement of federal
immigration law, including civil and criminal violations related to illegal entry,
unlawful presence, and illegal reentry, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
felonies and misdemeanors, including criminal enforcement of alien registration
laws, and federal document fraud and false statement crimes. Part III provides an
analysis of issues faced by local police making "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" determinations while enforcing federal immigration law.
Part IV identifies and briefly discusses federal law regulating the detention
and transfer by state and local law enforcement agencies of aliens detained or
incarcerated for immigration law violations. Part V is a checklist of nine practical
issues that local police departments should consider before initiating a new local
enforcement policy. Part VI mentions the policy arguments against local enforcement that have been widely discussed by opponents of local enforcement. Finally,
Part VII identifies significant concerns from the perspective of federal immigration officers.
I.

INHERENT AUTHORITY FOR LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW

It is frequently asserted that being an illegal alien is "not a crime" because the
detention and removal of most illegal aliens by the federal government is a civil
matter. This claim is based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between
federal criminal and immigration law, and the enforcement role given to local
government by the Constitution and the Congress. Unsanctioned entry into the
5
6

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (May 14, 2002).
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United States is a crime.7 Congress has firmly established that there is a significant public interest in the effective enforcement of immigration law. 8 The au-

thority of state and local police to make arrests for violation of federal law is not
limited to cases in which they are exercising delegated federal power.9 Local or

state law enforcement departments and personnel may not interpret or enforce
state law so as to obstruct federal law.10 Federal law encourages state and local

enforcement of immigration law.1 To turn an official blind eye to violations of
of state soverfederal immigration law in such circumstances is not an exercise 12
law.
federal
to
resistance
passive
impermissible
rather
but
eignty,
Congress could have chosen to limit local enforcement pursuant to its plenary
power over immigration, but it has not done so. In the absence of a limitation on
local enforcement powers, the states are bound by the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution to enforce violations of the federal immigration laws.

"The statutory law of the United States13is part of the law of each state just as if it
were written into state statutory law.",
State and local police officers are generally permitted to enforce federal stat-

utes where such enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory interests. 14 State and local law enforcement officials have the general power to
investigate and arrest violators of federal immigration statutes without prior INS
knowledge or approval, as long as state law does not restrict such general

7 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982)).
8 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982).
9 U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 591 (1948). Historically, U.S. states have extensively regulated
immigration. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 17761875, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993). Modern federal democracies like Canada and Germany also
have devolved immigration policy to constituent states. See Peter Schuck, Some State-Federal Developments in Immigration Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 387, 388 (2002).
10 Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
11 U.S. v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 913
(1999).
12 City of New York v. U.S., 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115 (2000).
13 People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1006 (1978) (citing Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483, 490 (1880), People ex rel. Happell v. Sichos, 23 Cal. 2d 478, 491(1943), and 150 A.L.R. 1431). See
also Dep't Public Safety v. Berg, 674 A.2d 515, 519 (Md. 1994) (stating that an act of Congress establishes a policy for "all the people and all the states," as if it "emanated from [a state's] own legislature." This principle is "underscored by [Art. 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights]").
14 Florida Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 38 (1963).
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power. 15 "A state trooper has16general investigative authority to inquire into possible immigration violations.'

The United States has a "compelling interest" in the criminal prosecution of
immigration law violators, which is part of a comprehensive, essential sovereign
policy of uniform immigration law enforcement. 17 Congress has specifically included local law enforcement officials among those who could arrest for violation

of the federal illegal presence misdemeanor. Section 1324(c) of Title 8 of the
United States Code now reads:
No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrest for a violation
of any provision of this section except officers and employees of the Service
designated by the Attorney General, either individually or as a member
of a
18
class, and all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws.

Sections 1324, 1325, and 1326 of Title 8 were all enacted on June 27, 1952, as
sections 274, 275, and 276 respectively of the Immigration and Nationality Act of

1952.19 As originally drafted, none of these sections contained any language of
limitation or exclusion regarding the power of arrest.2 ° Section 1324 was then
amended to add, "No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrest

for a violation of any provision of this section except officers and employees of
the Service ...and all other officers of the United States whose duty it is to

enforce criminal laws." 2 1 The intention of Congress at that juncture cannot be
misunderstood. Arrests for violation of section 1324 were to be made only by
federal personnel, while by clear implication section 1325 and section 1326 arrests
22
were to be made by state and local officers as well.
However, later in the legislative process the words "of the United States" were
stricken from section 1324 by further amendment. 23 In People v. Baraja, a Cali-

fornia court concluded, "[t]hat change can only mean that the scope of the arrest
15 Miller v. U.S., 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958); U.S. v. Haskin, 228 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2000); Marsh v.
U.S. 29 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1929) (stating that in New York state it is a general practice for local police
officers to arrest suspects for federal crimes, and that the Supremacy Clause makes a federal law as
valid a command within a state's borders as one of its own statutes, even if the offender cannot be
prosecuted in state courts).
16 U.S. v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing U.S. v. Saldana, 453
F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1972)).
17 U.S. v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).
18 8 U.S.C. 1324(c), INA § 274(c) (2004) (emphasis added); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d
468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1005 (1978).
19 Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274-76, 66 Stat. 228-29 (1952).
20 Immigration and Nationality Act, H.R. 5678, 82nd Cong. (Oct. 9, 1951) (as introduced by
Rep. Walter)21 H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 92 (1952) (emphasis added).
22 People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1005-06 (1978). See also E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965, 302-305 (1981).

23

98 CONG. REC. 4444 (Apr. 25, 1952) (H.R. 5678 as passed by House).
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power under section 1324 was enlarged; in no way can it mean that the scope of
arrest under the other two sections was restricted. Such an acute non sequitur
would attribute to the Congress both serious inconsistency and profound lack of
logic. ' 24
In 1996, Congress further clarified that a formal agreement is not necessary for
''any officer or employee" of a State or local agency "to communicate with the
Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual, including
reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United
States," or "to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension,25detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United
States."
Federal courts have recognized that the INA generally does not preclude state
and local governments from enforcing their own non-immigration-related laws
against immigrants. 26 In De Canas v. Bica, the United States Supreme Court held
in 1976 that a local regulation of immigration is unconstitutional only if it makes
"a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and
the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.' ' 27 Under the De Canas
rule, immigration-related state and local laws will be preempted only by
exception.
The arrest, detention, or transportation of aliens by local police enforcing
criminal provisions of the INA is not a regulatory "determination" of the conditions on alien entrance and residency, but merely enforcement of the previously
determined conditions.2 8 States can prosecute illegal aliens under state laws
without running afoul of the INA.29 State and local law enforcement officers are
not required to follow the regulations governing administration by federal agents
of the civil provisions of the INA.3 ° Most state and local laws do not attempt to
regulate who may come to and stay in the United States, and thus do not impinge
24 People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1005-06 (1978).
25 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), § 133, Pub.L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-563 (1996).
26 E.g., New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 1996) (New Jersey's prisons
contain illegal immigrant criminals because "[tihe state has made its own decision to prosecute illegal
aliens for acts they committed in violation of New Jersey's own criminal code . .
27 De Canas v. Bica, 424 US 351, 355 (1976).
28 Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983).
29 The Secretary of Homeland Security may not remove an alien sentenced to imprisonment
until the alien is released from imprisonment, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(A) (2004), except that in the case
of an alien confined pursuant to a final conviction for a non-violent offense who is in the custody of a
state or political subdivision, removal may be authorized if the chief state official determines that
removal is appropriate and in the best interest of the state, and submits a written request to DHS. 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2004).
30 Gates v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 205 (1987).
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upon the federal government's exclusive power to regulate immigration, even if
they affect immigrants.3 1
Other important amendments to federal law enacted in 1996 were intended by
Congress to encourage state and local agencies to participate in the process of
enforcing civil as well as criminal federal immigration laws by providing incentives such as reduced liability and specialized training.32 Section 133 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) specifically
created a formal mechanism for federal-local cooperation in the area of immigration law enforcement so that local police could effectively carry out enforcement
of immigration laws in a correct and efficient manner, subject to the "direction
and supervision of the United States Attorney General." However, section 133
may not be construed to require a formal agreement in order for "any officer or
employee" of a State or a political subdivision to communicate with the Department of Homeland Security regarding the immigration status of any individual, to
report knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United
States, or "otherwise to cooperate" with the Department in "the identification,
apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United
33

States."

United States vs. Vasquez-Alvarez

An important 1999 decision in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
independent authority of local police departments to enforce federal immigration
law, as long as state law prescribing police power of arrest authorized such an
arrest.34 The U.S. Department of Justice endorsed the doctrine in this case in an
internal policy change promulgated in April 2002. Fifth Circuit and Tenth Circuit
precedent are in accord on this issue.35
In February 1998, an Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) agent eating
dinner at an Edmond, Oklahoma restaurant observed an apparent drug transaction in the parking lot. The agent noted only the color and make of the two
vehicles involved, and that one of the parties was a Hispanic male. The INS
31 Jay T. Jorgensen, The PracticalPower of State and Local Governments to Enforce Federal
Immigration Laws, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899 (1997).
32 U.S. v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 913
(1999).
33 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), INA § 287(g) (2004). See infra note 267.
34 U.S. v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 913 (1999).
Only Oregon has expressly restricted federal immigration law cooperation by statute, ORS 181.150,
and the Oregon limitations have been interpreted narrowly. Oregon v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399
(1993). Even if construed restrictively, ORS 181.150 may still be subject to challenge for conflict with
federal statutes prohibiting state restrictions on employee non-cooperation.
35 See Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1370-71 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that no federal statute, including former Immigration and Nationality Act 1223(a), precludes state or local law enforcement agencies from taking other action to enforce this nation's immigration laws).
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agent suspected that an illegal drug transaction had occurred and that one of the
parties to the transaction was an illegal alien. He referred the matter to the Edmond police department for further investigation.
While the police were investigating the incident several days later at the restaurant, one of the suspects disclosed to the Edmond police that he was an illegal
alien. The local officer arrested the illegal alien, Ontoniel .Vasquez-Alvarez, for
illegal presence, a federal misdemeanor, and transported him to the city jail for
an immigration hold. A post-detention check of the alien's fingerprints revealed
that he was using an alias, had two prior felony convictions, and had been deported three times.
The alien was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The federal
public defender moved to suppress his identity, fingerprints, and statements to
local police, claiming that the arrest violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c), a 1996 statute
that permits state and local law enforcement officers to make a warrantless arrest
and detain an illegal alien if (1) the arrest is permitted by state and local law, (2)
the alien was previously deported after a felony conviction, and (3) prior to arrest, the local officer obtained "appropriate confirmation" of the alien's status
from the INS.
The District Court agreed that the arrest did not appear to comply with section
1252(c), but held that suppression was not an appropriate remedy. On appeal to
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the alien argued that section 1252(c) was the
exclusive authority for local police to arrest for violations of federal immigration
law, that the arrest did not comply with section 1252(c), and that suppression was
the appropriate remedy.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that, under long-standing case law, state and local law
enforcement officers have a general authority to arrestfor violations of federal law,
as long as state law authorizes such an arrest.36 Section 1252(c) did not preempt
that power, but instead added an "additional vehicle for enforcement." The
Court also found that the legislative history and the design of the statute were a
"clear invitation from Congress for state and local agencies to participate in the
process of enforcing federal immigration laws."3 7 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to accept a petition for certiorari from the alien.
Recent Debate on the Inherent Power Doctrine
Opponents of local police enforcement have focused on changing political attitudes toward immigration law enforcement to argue that local enforcement of
civil violations of federal immigration law is unlawful. State and local police are
said in general to lack the legal authority to enforce civil immigration law, unless
a specific cooperative agreement, executed with the Department of Homeland
36
37

Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1296.
Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
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Security or the Attorney General after a determination that a "mass influx" of
illegal aliens is imminent, has delegated enforcement powers to state or local law
enforcement agencies. 38
An alternative but weaker argument is that legal authority of local police to
enforce federal immigration is ambiguous, inconsistent, or unproven. Advocates
of this view point to variations between statements by Attorney General John
Ashcroft and the White House to support their position.39 The variant view, for
which a single letter from White House counsel Alberto Gonzales is cited as evidence, is that state and local police have inherent authority to enforce civil immigration law only if violators' names have been placed in the National Crime
4°
Information Center (NCIC) database.
Under Attorney General Ashcroft, the U.S. Department of Justice took the
position that state and local police have inherent authority to enforce civil immigration laws. The current view of the U.S. Department of Justice appears to be
that the inherent authority of state governments to make arrests for violations of
federal law is "not the creation of the federal government." Federal law permits
federal, state, and local law enforcement officials alike to arrest an individual
they have encountered who is "an alien of national security concern who has
been listed in the NCIC for violating immigration law," and to transfer such alien
into the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).4 1
In announcing the development of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) on June 5, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft referred to this authority when requesting that state and local police voluntarily
arrest aliens who have violated both (1) criminal provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, and (2) civil provisions that render an alien deportable, if
the alien has been listed in the NCIC, because the federal government has determined that they are special risks because (a) they present national security concerns or (b) are absconders who have not complied with a final order of removal.
According to the Department of Justice, the federal government has never pre-

38 Backgrounder:Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police, (National Immigration Forum) May 2004, available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=
572 (arguing that Congress created specific and limited avenues for local police to take on civil immigration law enforcement).
39 Id.; State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, AILA IssuE PAPER (American Immigration Lawyers' Association), Mar. 4, 2003.
40 Letter from Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales to Demetrios Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute (Oct. 24, 2002), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/whitehouse.
pdf.
41 Office of Legislative Counsel undated internal memorandum, pg. 59, attachment to Letter
from Acting Asst. Attorney General Jamie E. Brown to Hon. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., House
Comm. on the Judiciary (May 30, 2002) (on file with author).
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empted this authority. The only barriers to executing such arrests are statutes or
policies that states or municipalities may have imposed upon themselves.4 2
The most extensive statements to date of the U.S. Department of Justice's doctrine of inherent authority have been made by Kris W. Kobach, former counsel to
Attorney General Ashcroft, in testimony to both houses of Congress.43 In his
written statement, Kobach explained that the power to arrest and take temporary
custody of an immigration law violator is a subset of the broader power to "enforce" federal immigration law. The inherent arrest authority is narrower than
the statutory authority to "enforce" immigration law under section 287(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because it does not encompass the enumerated powers exercised by agents of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to interrogate a suspected alien, to initiate removal proceedings,
or to physically remove an alien from the territory of the United States, et
cetera.44
A 1996 opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel has been cited by opponents of
local enforcement as correctly arguing that local police may only enforce the
criminal provisions of federal, immigration law.45 Kobach responded that this internal guidance was withdrawn in April 2002 because it erroneously asserted that
Congress had preempted state arrests for civil violations of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.46
Kobach explained that the inherent arrest authority of states arises from their
pre-constitutional status as sovereign entities. The powers retained by the states
at the time of ratification proceeded "not from the people of the United States,
but from the people of the several states," and remain unchanged, except as they
have been "abridged" by the Constitution.4 7 The authority of a state to arrest for
violations of federal law is thus not delegated, but "inheres in the ability of one
48
sovereign to accommodate the interests of another sovereign.",
Kobach noted that this federalism-based analysis has a strong judicial pedigree. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged this doctrine for more than
42 Id. at 59-60.
43 Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws: Hearing on H.R. 2671 Before the House Subcomm.
on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (Oct.
1, 2003) (testimony of Kris W. Kobach) [hereinafter Kobach House Testimony]; CoordinatedEnforcement of Immigration Laws to Stop Terrorists;Hearing Before Senate Subcomm. on Immigration of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,108th Cong. (Apr. 22, 2004) (testimony of Kris W. Kobach) [hereinafter Kobach Senate testimony].
44 Kobach House testimony, supra note 43, at 1.
45 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion for the U.S.
Att'y., Southern Dist. of California, Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal
Aliens (Feb. 5, 1996), available at www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopola.htm.
46 Kobach House Testimony, supra note 43, at 2.
47 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 193 (1819).
48 Kobach House testimony, supra note 43, at 2.
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half a century, stating that "in the absence of an applicable federal statute the law
of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity.",49 More specifically, the Court has held that in the circumstance "of an arrest for violation of federal law by state peace officers, . . . the lawfulness of the

50
arrest without warrant is to be determined by reference to state law."
Finally, Kobach pointed out multiple reasons that make a particularly strong
case for the absence of congressional preemption of state enforcement authority.
State arrests for violations of federal law involve action by a state executive
branch agency to assist the federal government in the enforcement of federal law.

Kobach identified the "critical starting presumption" that it would be irrational

for the federal government to intend to deny itself assistance offered by the
states. No appellate court has expressly ruled that states are preempted from
arresting aliens for civil violations of immigration law. Kobach characterized as
"utterly unsustainable" the claim that field preemption exists to bar the authority

of state police to arrest for civil violations of immigration law, but not for criminal violations of those laws, since neither federal case law nor federal regulations
have ever held that civil provisions of immigration law "create a pervasive regula-

tory scheme indicating
congressional intent to preempt, while the criminal provi51
sions do not.",
Prohibitionson Police Non-cooperation with Immigration Law Enforcement
In 1996 Congress responded to widespread citizen complaints about resistance
and obstruction of INS enforcement activities by local governments by enacting
53
52
the welfare reform (PRWORA) and illegal immigration reform (IIRAIRA)
49 U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948).
50 Miller v. U.S., 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958) (citing U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, at 589 (1948)).
51 Kobach Senate testimony, supra note 43, at 2.
52 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105, § 434, codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2004): ("Notwithstanding any other provision
of Federal, State, or local law, no state or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way
restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information
regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.").
53 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009, § 642, codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2004):
(a) In general. Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal
State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any
government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional authority of government entities. Notwithstanding any other provision of
Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local entity from doing any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual:
(1) sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
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statutes. The omnibus legislation contained provisions that prohibited restrictions
on the authority of any government entity or official to share immigration or
citizenship status information. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and 8 U.S.C. § 1644, no
governmental agency may be prohibited from maintaining or exchanging information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual with the
Department of Homeland Security, or any other federal, state, or local government entity.
Both statutes are crafted using the broadest possible preemptory language.54
The National Employment Law Project, an opponent of immigration law enforcement, has argued that IIRAIRA restricts agency policies that prohibit
"maintaining" immigration status information, but does not preclude local policies to forego recording of immigration information entirely. 55 The Congressional
legislative history discredits this claim:
The conferees intend to give State and local officials the authority to communicate with the INS regarding the presence, whereabouts, or activities of
illegal aliens. This provision [PRWORA section 434] is designed to prevent
any State or local law, ordinance, executive order, policy, constitutional provision, or decision of any Federal or State court that prohibits or in any way
restricts any communication between State and local law enforcement and
the INS. The conferees believe that immigration law enforcement is as high
a priority as other aspects of Federal law enforcement, and that illegal aliens
do not have the right to remain in the U.S. undetected and
unapprehended.5 6
In support of the view that local non-cooperation ordinances and policies are
lawful, the National Council for La Raza has cited three settlements between
1984 and 1995 that were said to prohibit communication.5 7
Local, state, or federal government agencies that sanction or retaliate against
employees or officials who report immigration law violations to ICE or the Bor(2) maintaining such information.
(3) exchanging such information with any other Federal, State or local government
entity.
54 "Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,..."
55

REBECCA SMITH,

Low PAY, HIGH RISK: STATE MODELS FOR ADVANCING

IMMIGRANT

WORKERS' RIGHTS, Chap. 2, 13 (National Employment Law Project, updated Nov. 2003) (citing
IIRAIRA § 642(b)(2)), available at http://www.nelp.org/iwp/reform/state/low-pay-highjrisk.cfm.

56 Conference Report on H.R. 4, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1995, 141 Cong. Rec. H15433 (Dec. 21, 1995), 104th Congress 1st Session, Vol. 141 No.
206.
57

Michele Waslin, ImmigrationEnforcement by Local Police: The Impact on the Civil Rights of

Latinos, 9 National Council of La Raza Issue Brief 7-8 (Feb. 2003) (citing Velazquez v. Ackermann,
No. C-84-20723-JW (D. Cal. 1992); Mendoza v. City of Farmersville, No. CV-F-93-5789 (D. Cal.
1998); and De Haro v. City of St. Helena, No. CV-F-93-5789 (D. Cal. 1995)) available at http://www.
nclr.org/content/publications/detail/1390.).
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der Patrol can be sued by the whistleblower under 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or 8 U.S.C.
§ 1644 for damages and costs. In a 1998 administrative case supported by FAIR,
a California state government employee was awarded reinstatement and retroactive pay, benefits, and seniority after she was wrongly terminated for contacting
the INS.58
In a widely noted decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a
challenge to these statutes on constitutional grounds by the City of New York.
After enactment of PRWORA in 1996, New York City sued the federal government, claiming the restrictions on non-cooperation ordinances violated the Tenth
Amendment and exceeded the plenary power of Congress over immigration.
New York City claimed it had over 400,000 illegal alien residents at that time,
many of them living in mixed households with legal aliens and U.S. citizens. The
City argued that a guarantee of confidential treatment would insure that illegal
aliens were not afraid to report crimes or seek treatment for contagious diseases.
New York City asserted that it could elect not to participate in a federal regulatory program, and that the federal government could not disrupt the operations
of local governments through legislation.
The federal district court rejected New York's claims in 1997.' 9 On appeal by
the City, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed that the statutory ban
on non-cooperation policies was constitutional. 60 A policy protecting only noncitizens was not a general rule that protected confidential information for citizens
and aliens alike, but instead it had the intent and effect of obstructing federal
officials "while allowing local employees to share freely the information in question with the rest of the world.",6 1 New York City had no right to "passive resistance," because such claims violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution:
The City's sovereignty argument asks us to turn the Tenth Amendment's
shield against the federal government's using state and local governments to
enact and administer federal programs into a sword allowing states and localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal programs. If
Congress may not forbid states from outlawing even voluntary cooperation
with federal programs by state and local officials, states will at times have
the power to frustrate effectuation of some programs. Absent any cooperation at all from local officials, some federal programs may fail or fall short
of their goals unless federal officials resort to legal processes in every routine or trivial matter, often a practical impossibility. For example, resistance
58 In re San Joaquin County District Attorney's Office Family Support Division v. Tamara L.
Lowe, Cal. Civil Service Commission No. NB1776 (July 31, 1998).
59 City of New York v. U.S., 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
60 Id; 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 932 (2000).
61 Id. at 36-37.
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to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873
(1954), was often in the nature of a refusal by local government to cooperate
62
until under a court order to do so.
Perhaps the most effective argument by supporters of the view that local noncooperation ordinances are lawful is the recitation of the growing number of municipal governments that have enacted such measures and have not experienced
hostile legal challenges. 63 These sanctuary policies effectively prohibit city employees, including police, from reporting immigration violations to federal
authorities.
Anti-cooperation measures "testify to the sheer political power of immigrant
lobbies, a power so irresistible that police officers shrink from even mentioning
the illegal-alien crime wave.",6 4 However, acknowledgement that resistance to
federal immigration law is open and notorious in many localities with large illegal
alien populations does not negate the existence of significant case law supportive
of local or citizen remedies against such abuse.
For example, a local government agency custom or policy that extends affirmative benefits to a suspect class where such preferences are otherwise prohibited
by federal law, such as the protection from detention for immigration violations
or unlawful access to local government services, has been found to violate the
constitutional rights of a broad class of citizens and legal non-citizen residents to
65
due process and equal protection of the law.
Similarly, a policy or custom of acceptance of consular identification by a state
or a political subdivision of a state could deprive legal residents of the jurisdiction
of a constitutional right under color of state law. 66 By its nature, this violation is
ongoing. Citizens, who have a constitutional right to expect the protection of federal laws which prohibit unauthorized activities by non-citizens are denied equal
protection when a police department or magistrate acts in a manner that encourages or assists persons selected on the basis of nationality or alienage to engage in
such unlawful activities.6 7
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations requires authorities to inform detained or arrested foreign nationals that they have a right to have
62 Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
63 E.g. New York Mayoral Executive Order 41 (Sept. 17, 2003) (creating a city-wide confidentiality policy); San Francisco Admin. Code § 12H (1989); Portland City Code Chapt. II Art. II Sec. 2125 (June 2, 2003); Seattle Municipal Code 4.18/ Ordinance 121063 (Feb. 5, 2003).
64 Heather MacDonald, The Illegal-Alien Crime Wave, 14 CrrY JOURNAL 1 (2004), available at
http://www.city-journal.org/html/14-1_the-illegal-alien.html.
65 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107, 108-9 (2d Cir.
2001).
66 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
67 Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that although there
is no general constitutional right to police protection, the state may not discriminate in providing such
protection).
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their consulates notified of their status without delay.6 8 Article 36 does not create
an enforceable right of action in U.S. courts for alien detainees. 69 The courts
have not addressed whether a municipal police department may assert that it has
an affirmative duty to comply with consular notification treaties, but may also
elect to knowingly restrict communication of the same status-based information
to U.S. immigration authorities.
Aggrieved residents may sue in state or federal court to block unlawful municipal passive resistance policies, and may sue officials and employees in their official or private capacities for violations of their rights. 70 Local government
officials do not possess Eleventh Amendment immunity or qualified immunity
when sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief
to end statutory and constitutional violations. 71 Qualified immunity does not
shield government officials, or private parties acting in concert with public offi72
cials, from complaints for injunctive relief.
PART

II.

CURRENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAW

In practice, local and state police infrequently rely on their inherent power to
enforce federal immigration law. Typically, a person is detained or arrested by
police for a criminal offense under state or local law. The immigration status of
the arrested person then comes into question based on information identified in a
post-arrest investigation. Even if local police authority is construed to restrict an
officer's arrest power for a purely civil violation of immigration law, police retain
expansive enforcement authority under federal criminal law. Part II surveys that
body of existing law, and its enforcement by local police agencies.

68 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Art. 36 (1)(b), April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261:
(If [the detainee] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national
of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without
delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights
under this sub-paragraph.)
69 U.S. v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60-63 (1st Cir 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956 (2000).
70 Yellow Freight Systems v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (stating that federal and state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal civil rights suits).
71 Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 673 (8th Cir. 1997); Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dept. of Mental
Health, 41 F.3d 584, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1994) (regarding 11th Amendment immunity); Kikamura v.
Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 956 (10th Cir. 2001) (regarding qualified immunity).
72 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992).
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Immigration Status Offenses
A.

Unlawful Presence

The distinctions between unlawful presence in the United States, illegal entry,
and illegal reentry are important, and may be confusing to police officers whose
primary experience has been the enforcement of state criminal laws.
Unlawful presence is a civil violation of federal law. The general rule against
illegal presence in U.S. immigration law is that any alien who is "present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled" or who arrives in the U.S. "at
any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General" is
inadmissible.7 3
Most aliens from Mexico and Canada who are detained in the United States
without proof of legal admission are routinely offered administrative voluntary
departure. 74 As a matter of administrative economy, the Border Patrol or U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement will generally not initiate removal proceedings or assess fines unless the alien is a recidivist.
Unlike apprehension, the removal of aliens from the U.S. is exclusively a federal function. Only a federal immigration judge may order that an alien be deported. Local and state courts lack the authority to require removal or departure
75
as a condition of bond, parole, or as part of a plea bargain.
The "bars to admissibility" imposed by Congress in 1996 are significant sanctions for illegal aliens detained in the interior of the country. Any alien who voluntarily departs the U.S. after being unlawfully present for more than 180 days
but less than one year is inadmissible for three years from the date of the alien's
departure. Aliens who do not depart voluntarily or who are unlawfully present
for one year or more are inadmissible for ten years after the date of departure or
removal. Illegal aliens who have been in the country for less than six months at
the time of apprehension thus have a strong incentive to disclose their illegal
76
immigration status and immediately request or accept voluntary departure.
Bars to admissibility are important enforcement tools that penalize illegal
aliens who later seek to reenter the U.S. lawfully or try to adjust their status
through legal means, such as marriage or permanent immigration programs, after
first entering unlawfully or overstaying their visas. It is good practice for police
departments to routinely record information on illegal aliens who are identified
during the course of routine police activities and to report the information to
73 INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2004).
74 See infra note 289, and accompanying text.
75 Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), U.S. v. Chukwura, 5 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir 1993); U.S. v.
Quaye, 57 F.3d 447 (5th Cir 1995). However, procedures for "judicial deportation" by federal district
courts are provided in INA § 238(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c). See infra notes 300-305.
76 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2004).
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ICE, in order to document illegal presence for enforcement of the three-year and
ten-year bar to reentry.
B.

Illegal Entry Criminal Offenses

An alien can unlawfully enter or remain in the United States in five different
ways:
(i) Present without inspection (PWI). Any alien who enters U.S. territory
without presenting himself or herself
to an immigration inspector at a
77
designated point of entry is "PWI.,,
(ii) Appearing for inspection at a point of entry without proper documents.78 Typically, this provision applies to persons who attempt to
enter at U.S. land borders hoping that their documents will not be
checked.
(iii) Appearing for inspection and making a material misrepresentation that
makes the alien excludable. 79 The misrepresentation could be made
with false documents, false statements to the inspector, or presentation
of a valid visa that was obtained by fraud.
(iv) Overstaying the time period authorized
for a temporary period of stay
80
after entering the country legally.
(v) Entering the United States legally, but becoming deportable for other
violations of the terms of admission. Common grounds for deportability
include unauthorized employment and conviction of an aggravated felony or a crime of moral turpitude.8 "
The criminal offense of illegal entry is found in Immigration and Nationality
Act section 275. Any alien who enters (or attempts to enter) the U.S. (i) without
inspection (PWI), or (ii) who "eludes examination or inspection, or (iii) by "a
willfully false or misleading misrepresentation or the willful concealment of a material fact" has committed a criminalmisdemeanor,punishable by a fine and up to
82
six months in prison.
Misdemeanor prosecutions for section 275 are uncommon, because the great
majority of illegal aliens will accept voluntary departure if apprehended. A section 275 charge usually results from plea-bargaining by a federal prosecutor on
more serious crimes such as section 274 smuggling felonies (discussed below).
77 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6); 8 U.S.C. § 1201(f); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (2004). In 1996, section 414 of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214) and section
301 of IIRAIRA removed entry without inspection as a ground for deportation and substituted being
present in the United States without admission or parole as a ground for inadmissibility.
78 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (2004).
79 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2004).
80 8 U.S.C. § 1182)(a)(9)(b)(ii) (2004).
81 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2004).
82 INA § 275(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2004).
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However, many prosecutors fail to make use of the general federal statute that
permits large fines for all federal immigration crimes beyond the fines authorized
can range up to
by the individual statutes. Such fines on convicted individuals
83
misdemeanor.
a
for
$100,000
and
felony
a
for
$250,000
C. Illegal Entry and Reentry Felonies
While criminal penalties for a single illegal entry are relatively light, multiple
illegal entries and illegal re-entry are separate, serious felonies.
First, a subsequent or multiple "commission" of an illegal entry or attempted
entry is a felony punishable by up to two years imprisonment.8 4 An alien who
voluntarily admits to having entered illegally should be asked if he or she crossed
the border on a prior occasion. If the alien gives a positive response, but cannot
provide evidence that the prior entry or entries were lawful, local police in all
states have probable cause to arrest the declarant for felony multiple illegal entry.
Second, Immigration and Nationality Act section 276 (Reentry of Removed
Alien) makes it a felony for any alien who (i) has been denied admission, was
excluded, deported, or removed, or has departed the U.S. under a voluntary departure order, (ii) to thereafter enter, attempt to enter, or be found "at any time"
in the U.S., (iii) without the advance permission of the Attorney General, (iv)
unless the alien demonstrates he or she was not required to obtain advance
85
permission.
The five-year statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 applies to an illegal
reentry offense, but the crime is not complete and the statute does not begin to
run until the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement discovers the illegal
so long
alien's presence in the United States. 86 The crime is also not completed
87
as the alien uses false statements or identity to avoid detection.
The penalty for an illegal reentry conviction is a fine and up to two years imprisonment. This penalty increases to ten years imprisonment if the alien was
removed after: (i) commission of three drug-related misdemeanors, a crime
against the person, or a felony; (ii) subversion, sabotage, terrorist activities, membership in a totalitarian organization, or designation as a national security risk; or
(iii) illegal reentry after being paroled from a U.S. prison sentence. 88 Conviction
for an aggravated felony increases the possible prison sentence to up to twenty
years.
83
84
85
86
87
88

18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2004).
Id.
INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2004).
U.S. v. Mercedes, 287 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 55.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2004).
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D.

Alien Smuggling Felonies under Immigration and Nationality Act
Section 274(a)

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 274 (Bringing in and Harboring Illegal Aliens) encompasses a range of crimes associated with illegal immigration under the rubric of "alien smuggling." The four major crimes under section
274(a) of INA ('bringing in,' transporting, harboring, and 'inducing' illegal aliens)
are described separately below. Together they form a comprehensive definition
of the federal crime of alien smuggling that prosecutors and police can use to
attack the economic basis of illegal alien settlement in local jurisdictions, as well
as related support activities, from the conspiracy and preparation stages in the
sending country to illegal operations within the United States.89 An alien convicted under this statute is deemed to be an "aggravated felon" subject to
mandatory federal detention and removal. 90
It is well established that "any person" is subject to criminal liability for section 274 felonies and that the term is to be construed broadly. 91 Section 274
clearly reaches public officials and government employees. The courts have rejected claims that section 274 felonies apply only to professional smugglers or
92
operators of sweatshops.
The crime typically thought of as alien smuggling, "bringing" illegal aliens to
the United States, makes it a felony for any person to (i) knowingly bring to or
attempt to bring (ii) an alien, regardless of immigration status, (iii) to the United
States "in any manner whatsoever" (iv) at any place other than a designated port
of entry. 93 A separate misdemeanor offense criminalizes bringing or attempting
to bring an alien to the United States "knowing or in reckless disregard of the
fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to enter or
reside in the United States" regardless of where or how the alien entered U.S.
territory. 94 Law enforcement officers in jurisdictions away from the international
borders make arrests leading to "bringing to" convictions infrequently, because
89

U.S. v. Sanchez-Vargas, 878 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1989).
90 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N) (2004) (designating violations of INA § 274(a)(1) or (b) as aggravated felonies, with an exception for a first conviction where the offense was committed only for the
purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding the alien's spouse, child, or parent to violate a provision of the
INA); Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2002).
91 U.S. v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 136 (4th
Cir. 1993); Villegas-Valenzuela v. INS, 103 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1996).
92 Zheng, 306 F.3d at 1085; U.S. v. Sanchez-Vargas, 878 F.3d 1163. 1169 (9th Cir. 1989).
93 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), INA § 274(a)(1)(A)(i) (2004).
94 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), INA § 274(a)(2) (2004). Felony penalties are imposed if the offense is
committed for purposes of committing a felony, for commercial advantage or private financial gain, or
where the alien is not immediately brought and presented to an appropriate immigration officer at a
designated point of entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B) (2004).
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the offense is considered complete once the alien reaches an "immediate destination" in the United States.9 5
In contrast, the other related felony offenses under section 274 of INA are a
powerful enforcement tool for local and state police. First, section
274(a)(1)(A)(iii) of INA makes it a felony for any person to (i) "conceal, harbor,
or shelter from detection" (ii) any alien (iii) in any place, including any building
or means of transportation, (iv) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that
96
the alien has come to, entered, or remained in the U.S. in violation of law."
"Harboring" includes any conduct that tends to substantially help an alien to
remain in the United States unlawfully.9 7 There is no requirement that the felonious conduct be part of a process of smuggling aliens into United States or directly connected with an alien's illegal entry. Providing housing for illegal aliens,
assistance in obtaining employment, coaching aliens to claim legal status or to use
a false name, and attempts to prevent detection by the authorities have all been
held to constitute harboring. 98 Harboring can occur outdoors as well as in a
building.
"Shielding from detection" does not need to be clandestine. 99 The government
does not need to show intent to evade federal immigration enforcement officials,
but only that the defendant's conduct "tend[ed] directly or substantially to facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States in violation of law." 10 0 Taking acheld to constitute acting
tions that "facilitate" an alien's employment have been
10 1
"in reckless disregard" of a worker's illegal status.
Criminal liability for harboring or sheltering could arise from acceptance of a
Mexican matricula consular-which,presented without proper immigration documents, is prima facie evidence of illegal alien status-by a local government
agency that, for example, provided housing or utility assistance, made referrals to
a public or private job assistance program, or detained matricula presenters for
violation of city ordinances and released them without verifying their immigra10 2
tion status with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Second, section 274(a)(1)(A)(ii) of INA makes it a felony for any person to (i)
transport, move, or attempt to move (ii) an alien (iii) within the U.S. (iv) by
means of transportation or otherwise (v) knowingly or recklessly disregarding the
fact that the alien has come to, entered, or remains in violation of law and (vi) "in
95 U.S. v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1991).
96 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), INA § 274(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2004) (emphasis added).
97 U.S. v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1975).
98 U.S. v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Pong Sub Shin, No. 98-1142, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 902 (2d Cir. unpub. 1999).
99 U.S. v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1073 (5th Cir. 1982).
100 U.S. v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1463 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
101 U.S. v. Myung Ho Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1999).
102 A legal analysis of liability issues related to local government acceptance of consular identification cards is available from the FAIR legal department.
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furtherance of such violation." 10 3 Intent to further the alien's presence in the
U.S. is a required element, but may be established by indirect evidence. 0 4 An
offer of employment plus voluntary transportation, or payment for transportation
plus lodging or other arrangements, 10 5 assistance in loading aliens into vehicles
driven by other defendants, 10 6 or providing one leg of an illegal alien's travel
within the U.S. 1 ° 7 will satisfy the furtherance element. Local police conducting
traffic stops should be aware of indicators of reckless endangerment during transportation, including transporting persons in the back of a pick-up truck,10 8 or
without an adequate number of safety belts or seats, 10 9 transporting children or
other vulnerable persons in the trunk or other enclosed area, 110 or carrying substantially more passengers than the rated capacity of a motor vehicle or vessel.11 1
Third, section 274(a)(1)(A)(iv) of INA makes it a felony for any person to (i)
encourage or induce (ii) an alien (iii) to come to, enter or reside in the U.S. (iv)
knowing or recklessly disregarding the fact that the alien's entry or residence is in
violation of law. 112 This statute is intended to criminalize a broad range of activities that assist illegal aliens in the United States.
"Encourage" means to knowingly instigate, help, or advise. "Induce" means
to knowingly bring on or about, to effect, cause, or influence an act or course of
conduct.113 "Encouraging" includes actions that permit illegal aliens "to be more
confident that they could continue to reside with impunity in the United States,"
or actions that offer illegal aliens "a chance to stand equally with all other American citizens." '114 To prove that an official or employee of a Georgia state or local
government "encouraged or induced" illegal Mexican aliens, all that a prosecuting party needs to establish is that such persons knowingly helped or advised the
1 15
aliens.
Specific actions found to constitute encouraging include counseling illegal
aliens to continue working in the U.S. or assisting them to complete applications
with false statements or obvious errors or omissions.' 6 The fact that the illegal
alien may be a refugee fleeing persecution is not a defense to this felony, since
103 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), INA§ 274(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2004).
104 U.S. v. Beltran-Garcia, 179 F.3d 1200, 1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999).
105 E.g., U.S. v. One 1985 Ford F-250 Pickup, 702 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D. Mich. 1988); U.S. v. One
1982 Chevrolet Crew-Cab Truck, 810 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1987).
106 U.S. v. Colwell, 7 Fed. Appx. 555, 557; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3996 (9th Cir. 2001).
107 U.S. v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2000).
108 U.S. v. Cuyler, 298 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2002).
109 U.S. v. Maldonado-Ramires, 384 F.3d 1228, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2004).
110 U.S. v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004).
111 U.S. v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (11th Cir. 2004).
112 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), INA§ 274(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2004).
113 U.S. v. He, 245 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2001).
114 U.S. v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1993).
115 He, 245 F. 3d at 957-59.
116 Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 137.
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U.S. law and the United Nations Protocol on Refugees both require that an alien
claiming asylum must report to immigration authorities "without delay" upon entry to the U.S.
Fourth, it is a felony to conspire to commit any of the bringing in, harboring,
sheltering, transporting, or encouraging felonies under section 274(a)(1)(A) of
INA. 117 Indictments for section 274(a) of INA smuggling crimes can include conspiracy as a separate offense. 1 8 The three elements of criminal conspiracy are (i)
an agreement by two or more persons to engage in illegal activity, (ii) an overt act
by at least one person taken in furtherance of the agreement, and (iii) intent to
commit the illegal activity. 119 Even if the conspiracy fails to achieve its aim, it is
often punished separately and as severely as the single offender crime, because a
group having some illegal purpose is more dangerous than an individual who has
120

the same purpose.
The distinction between principals and accessories in alien smuggling crimes
has been eliminated by the section 274(a)(1) of INA aiding and abetting statute. 1 21 Aiding and abetting an alien smuggling offense may apply to conduct
before or after the alien has entered the U.S. 1 22 The statute allows conviction for
an alien smuggling felony even if not all of the elements of the alien smuggling
crime are proven. Indictments for both an alien smuggling crime and for aiding
and abetting that crime are permissible. Defendants convicted of aiding and abetting or conspiracy to commit section 274(a)(1) of INA alien smuggling felonies
are subject to the same fines and prison sentences imposed for the primary
offenses.' 2 3

Persons indicted for section 274(a) of INA criminal alien smuggling offenses
may also be indicted under the generic federal aiding and abetting 124 or accessory
117 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), INA § 274(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) (2004).
118 INA § 274 (a)(1)(A)(v) (2004) makes (1) conspiracy to commit a § 274(a) offense and (2)
aiding and abetting a § 274(a) offense separate felonies. The general conspiracy to commit any offense against the United State statute (18 U.S.C. § 371) is also often added to indictments for alien
smuggling offenses.
119 U.S. v. Colwell, 7 Fed. Appx. 555, at 557 (9th Cir. 2001), citing U.S. v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452,457
(9th Cir. 1991).
120 Callanan v. U.S., 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961); Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949).
121 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) (2004).
122 U.S. v. Zhou Liang, 224 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000) (offense of attempted alien smuggling can be committed extraterritorially and continue into U.S. territory).
123 Penalties for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) are set by § 1324(a)(1)(B) (2004).
124 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). The primary difference between an aiding and abetting conviction
under the Title 8 and Title 18 statutes is the sentencing provision. U.S. v. Tyson Foods, No. 4:01-CR061, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20174 (E.D. Tenn. 2003). See also the analysis of congressional intent to
increase penalties for alien smuggling crimes committed for commercial purposes that underlies different penalties for aiding and abetting under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) and aiding and abetting an 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) alien smuggling offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2 in U.S. v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786, 800804 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 966 (2002).
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after the fact statutes. 125 Generic aiding and abetting is not a lesser-included
offense for a conviction under section 274(a) of INA,' 26 but is implicit in all alien
127
smuggling indictments.
No policy or humanitarian argument has been identified by the courts that
would negate the criminal mens rea of reckless disregard for the fact that aliens
are present in the United States in violation of law. Neither sanctuary nor humanitarian concern is a valid defense to either civil or criminal violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It is illegal for non-profit, religious, or civic
organizations to knowingly assist in the commission of an alien smuggling felony,
regardless of claims that their members' convictions may require them to assist
aliens. 128 The First Amendment does not protect actions that aid illegal aliens to
1 29
remain in the United States.
Illegal aliens are not a suspect class entitled to Fourteenth Amendment-based
strict scrutiny of any discriminatory classification based on that status, nor are
they defined by an immutable characteristic, since their status is the product of
conscious unlawful action. 130 Identity is not a constitutionally protected privacy
right, and an illegal alien has no expectation of privacy from another person's
knowledge of his or her immigration status.13
E.

Hiring More than Ten Illegally Smuggled Aliens in One Year

In addition to civil penalties for individual hires of unauthorized aliens, section
274(a)(3) of INA makes it a felony for any person to (i) hire (ii) within any 12month period (iii) at least ten individuals (iv) with actual knowledge that the
individuals hired (v) were not legal permanent residents and had not been authorized to work by the INS, and (vi) had been "brought to" the United States in
violation of section 274(a) of INA. 132
125 8 U.S.C. § 3 (2004). Whoever, knowing that an alien smuggling offense has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension
is an accessory after the fact. Specific or willful intent is not required. An accessory to an alien
smuggling offense may be sentenced or fined not more than half the maximum punishment prescribed
for the principal.
126 U.S. v. Pruitt, 719 F.2d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 (1983).
127 U.S. v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 165(4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 922 (2003).
128 AFSC v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1992), Intercommunity Ctr. for Peace and
Justice v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990).
129 U.S. v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954-57.
130 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
131 U.S. v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 616-19 (8th Cir. 2001). See also Jane Doe 1 v.
Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387, 392 (E.D. Va. 2004), ("unlawful or problematic immigration status is simply
not the type of 'personal information of the utmost intimacy"' to permit illegal aliens to proceed
anonymously in civil cases); Mendoza. v. Zirkle Fruit Co., No. CY-00-3024, Memorandum Order, at 45 (E.D. Wa. Apr. 25, 2003) (immigration status data on 1-9 Form is not information protected by
federal privilege or privacy law).
132 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (2004).
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This statute is intended to target employers of illegal aliens who have also
participated in alien smuggling crimes. Evidence that the employer had actual
(not circumstantial) knowledge of the alien smuggling activity is generally the
most difficult element for a section 274(a)(3) conviction.33 This felony has also
been the predicate crime in most successful immigration-related civil racketeer134
ing (RICO) litigation.
F.

Operating a Sweatshop

It is a felony to knowingly establish a "commercial enterprise" for the purpose
of evading any provision of federal immigration law. Violators may be fined or
imprisoned for up to five years.135
G.

Possession of Firearms and Ammunition by Aliens

Aliens who are illegally or unlawfully in the United States are prohibited from
1 36
shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving any firearm or ammunition.
The definition of firearm includes any weapon that will expel a projectile or any
137
"destructive device."
It is also a felony for any person, including a licensed firearms dealer, to sell or
give a firearm to a person the transferor knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is an alien in the U.S. in violation of law. 1 3 8 Under the Brady Handgun Act,
dealers may not transfer a handgun to an individual unless the recipient certifies
in writing that he or she is not an illegal alien or-with limited exceptions-a
non-immigrant legal alien. 139 In a private sale, the seller has the legal responsibility to determine that he or she is not transferring a firearm to a person who is not
lawfully entitled to receive it. Illegal aliens can also be convicted for making false
statements in connection with a weapons transaction.1 4 ° Violation of these statutes is an aggravatedfelony, punishable by ten years imprisonment, a fine, and
deportation of the convicted alien.
Criminal Enforcement of Alien Registration Laws
All aliens fourteen years of age or older who are in the United States for thirty
days or more by statute must be registered and fingerprinted.1 41 Parents or legal
guardians must register alien children who are younger than fourteen. The De133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See, e.g., Sys. Mgmt. Inc. v. Loiselle, 91 F. Supp. 2d 401, 408 (D. Mass. 2000).
Comm. Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).
8 U.S.C. § 1325(d) (2004). See, e.g., U.S. v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2001).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2004), referring to 18 U.S.C. § 921(3)(A) (2004).
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2004).
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(5) (2004).
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3)(B)(v) (2004).
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2004).
8 U.S.C. § 1301 (2004).
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partment of Homeland Security issues a certificate of registration or a permanent
resident card to every alien who registers. Non-immigrants must also report address changes every three months on Form AR-11, available at post offices.
Every alien who has been issued a registration document is required to carry
the document on his or her person. 142 Federal regulations specify the immigra143
tion documents that are evidence of alien registration.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the unregistered presence of an alien in
the United States is in itself a crime. The United States has an express public
144
policy against the presence of an unregistered alien in this country.
Violators of registration requirements are subject to civil and criminal penalties. Since September 11, federal prosecutors have increasingly used registration
laws as a simple tool to fight illegal immigration. Willful failure or refusal to
comply with registration requirements 145 and knowingly making false statements
on a registration application146 are both criminal misdemeanors, subject to a
$1,000 fine and/or six months imprisonment. Failure to register is a continuing
violation for which there is no statute of limitations.1 4 7 Other related criminal
misdemeanors are failure to have a registration card in personal possession ($100
fine and/or 30 days imprisonment),1 48 and failure to report a change of address
($200 fine and/or 30 days). 149 Any alien convicted of making a false statement on
a registration application or who fails to report a change of address without a
reasonable excuse must be detained by law enforcement officials and removed by
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Counterfeiting registration documents is a felony punishable by five years imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine. 1 50
A law enforcement officer has probable cause to detain an individual who admits he or she is an alien (legal or illegal) but is not in possession of registration
toa152
h offense
fes is a
documents. 151 Since failure to
register is a continuing crime, the
142 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2004).
143 8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b) (2004); 1-94 (Arrival-Departure Record); 1-95 (Crewmen's Landing Permit); 1-184 (Alien Crewmen Landing Permit and ID Card); 1-185 (Nonresident Alien Canadian Border Crossing Card); 1-186 (Nonresident Alien Mexican Border Crossing Card); 1-221 (Order to Show
Cause & Notice of Hearing); 1-551 (Permanent Resident Card); 1-688 (Temporary Resident Card); I688A (Employment Authorization Card); 1-688B (Employment Authorization Document); 1-766
(Employment Authorization Document). An INS/DHS endorsement in the passport of an alien applicant for adjustment is also evidence of registration.
144 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1984).
145 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2004).
146 8 U.S.C. § 1306(c) (2004).
147 U.S. v. Franklin, 188 F.2d 182, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1951).
148 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2004).
149 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2004).
150 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b)-(d) (2004).
151 Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216, 219 (9th Cir. 1995).
152 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 n.3 (1984).
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criminal misdemeanor committed in a law enforcement officer's presence, a
crime for which a warrantless arrest can be made in most jurisdictions.
However, it remains unsettled whether recently arrived illegal aliens who enter
the U.S. without inspection, and thus were never "issued" registration documents, can be charged with violating the statute requiring possession of registration documents.' 53 Currently the best practice for local officers questioning an
alien without documentation is to first inquire if the alien has been in the United
States for more than thirty days, and to then ask if the alien received an 1-94 form
(Arrival-Departure Report) at inspection, or if the alien
has a "green card" or
154
other document fulfilling the registration requirement.
If during a consensual encounter or Terry stop the alien claims to have no
registration document because he is a United States citizen, and then provides
the local officer with a false or forged document, probable cause may exist to
arrest the alien for a felony false claim of U.S. citizenship.15 5 Alternatively, if the
alien freely admits that he is illegally in the U.S., the officer may detain the alien
for pickup by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Federal Document Fraud and False Statement Crimes
Illegal aliens seeking to evade detection can be arrested on federal felony
charges for false or fraudulent use of a number of documents that are frequently
presented to local police officers. Materiality is not an element of federal false
156
statement crimes unless specifically included in the statute.
Section 1546 of Title 18 of the United States Code criminalizes the use or attempted use of false or unlawfully obtained immigration documents by an alien
as evidence of authorization to enter, stay, or work in the United States. Section
1546(a) prohibits five types of fraud and misuse of entry documents. Under this
section, it is a felony to:
(1) knowingly forge, counterfeit, alter, or falsely make any document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into the U.S., or as evidence of
authorized stay or employment in the U.S. Specific documents include
immigrant or non-immigrant visas, permits, border crossing cards, and
alien registration receipts;
153 U.S. v. Mendez-Lopez, 528 F. Supp 972, 973-74 (N.D. Okla. 1981).
154 "Green card" is the colloquial term for an alien registration receipt card. U.S. v. SalinasCalderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1298 n.1 '10th Cir. 1984).
155 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2004). Answering affirmatively to the question "Are you a U.S. citizen?"
constitutes a claim of citizenship if made to a local law enforcement officer. Smiley v. U.S. 181 F.2d
505, 507 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950).
156 U.S. v. Hart, 291 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding materiality not an element of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1542 false statement in passport application); U.S. v. Abuagla, 336 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
materiality not an element of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) false statement in a naturalization proceeding).
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"utter, ' 15 7 use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive any
such document, knowing that it was forged, counterfeited, altered or
falsely made, was procured by a false claim or statement, or was otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained;
(3) possess or sell a blank permit or visa printing plate, or security paper
used to print visas, documents, or permits;
(4) impersonate another person or falsely use the name of a dead person, or
to evade or attempt to evade the immigration laws by appearing under an
assumed or false name-without disclosing one's true identity-while applying for any visa, permit, or other document required for entry to the
U.S., or when applying for admission to the U.S; or
(5) sell, or otherwise dispose of, or to offer to sell or otherwise dispose of, or
to utter any visa, permit, or other document required for admission to the
U.S.
Section 1546 covers the possession of any knowingly forged document designated by statute or regulation for entry into, stay in, or employment in the United
States. Possession of a counterfeit or altered foreign passport has been held to
violate section 1546(a). 158 It is not necessary for a conviction under section
1546(a) to prove intent to violate "immigration law" or to obtain an "immigration
benefit." Under section 1546(a), impersonation while seeking admission into the
U.S. is a felony, even if the alien was not applying for an entry document.
(2)

False Birth Certificates
Any person who knowingly presents a false or forged birth certificate issued
by any state, or a copy thereof, or any other document issued under any law of
the United States, to support a claim of U.S. citizenship by a person not born in
159
the United States, has violated three related federal felony statutes.
Federal False Claims Regarding Immigration Status
Illegal aliens frequently attempt to use real documents under false pretenses in
order to receive federal public benefits and work authorization, or remain in the
United States without detection. The broad federal statute criminalizing false
statements is 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which makes it a federal felony to (1) falsify, conceal, or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device, (2) make any false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statements or representations, or (3) make use of any false writing or
document, knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, (4) with respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of any United
157 Generally, to put a document into circulation or public use.
158 U.S. v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 118 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied 120 S.Ct. 439 (1999).
159 18 U.S.C. § 1015(c) (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1426(a)-(c), (h) (2004).
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States department or agency. 160 Under section 1001, the presentation of fraudulent documents to local peace officers is a federal felony. If a false statement is
made to a local law enforcement agency through the use of any false document
which conceals that the person making the false representation is illegally in the
United States in violation of federal immigration law,
that statement would fall
"within the jurisdiction of a United States agency. ' 16 1
A false claim to U.S. citizenship for the purpose of obtaining a federal or state
benefit, or to work, or to vote, is a separate crime, punishable by up to five years
162
imprisonment.
Felony Identification Document Fraud
Immigration document fraud is a felony enforceable by local police officers
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028. The statute criminalizes eight types of knowing conduct
that relate to false identification documents and which, with the exception of (4)
on the list, must additionally either (i) appear to be issued under the authority of
the United States, or (ii) be "in or affect interstate or foreign commerce":
1 63
(1) to produce a document without lawful authority;
(2) to transfer a document knowing that it was stolen or produced without
lawful authority;
(3) to possess five or more documents with intent to use or transfer
unlawfully;
(4) to possess a document with the intent to defraud the United States;
(5) to produce, transfer or possess a document-making implement to be used
in the production of a false identification document;
(6) to possess a stolen or unlawfully produced document that appears to be a
United States identification document;
(7) to transfer or use, without lawful authority, a "means of identification of
another person" with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any violation of
federal law, or any felony under any applicable state or local law; or
160 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2004).
161 U.S. v. Montemayor, 712 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93
(1941) (holding that the term "jurisdiction" merely incorporates Congress' intent that the statute apply whenever false statements would result in the perversion of the authorized functions of a federal
department or agency); U. S. v. Lewis, 587 F.2d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that proof of defendant's knowledge that a federal agency was involved in the matter is not an essential element of a
section 1001 conviction).
162 8 U.S.C. § 1015(e), (f) (2004). This provision is also distinct from a false claim of citizenship
under 8 U.S.C. § 911 (2004). See supra note 155.
163 'Producing' an identification document includes obtaining the document unlawfully from a
motor vehicle department employee or other innocent third party. U.S. v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 165
(4th Cir. 2003).
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(8) to traffic in authentication
features for use in false documents or document
164
making machinery.
The legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) suggests that a conviction for
felony document fraud could be obtained for the misuse of a consular identification card by an illegal alien, including the controversial matricula consular issued
by Mexican consulates in the United States, to obtain a government benefit or
service for which lawful presence is a prerequisite.1 65 The definition of "identification document" in section 1028(d)(2) includes a document intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals, that is made or
issued by a foreign government, political subdivision of a foreign government, an
international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization.
Violation of a federal, state or local law is not an essential element of a conviction
1 66
for use of an identity document to defraud the United States.
Other commonly accepted documents whose misuse is criminalized by section
1028 include INS Form 1-94 (Arrival and Departure Record), social security
cards, and state university identification cards.' 6 7 Use of blank identification
documents that have not been completed with information relating to a particular
individual is also prohibited.16 8 Penalties upon conviction are heavy, including a
fine and imprisonment for up to fifteen years, and forfeiture of any personal
1 69
property used or intended to be used to commit the offense.
Felony Misuse of Social Security Numbers
Any person who, for any purpose, but with intent to deceive, falsely represents
a social security number to have been assigned to him or to another person, when
in fact such number was not assigned as represented, or any person who alters,
buys, sells, or counterfeits a social security card, or possesses a counterfeit card
with intent to sell or alter it, has committed a federal felony. 170 Intentional use of

a false social security card is a serious offense that can warrant an upward departure from federal sentencing guidelines. 1 71 In post 9-11 terrorism investigations,
section 408(a)(7) has been widely used to prosecute individuals using false identi164 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2004).
165 H.R. Rep. No. 97-802, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3519, 3527.
166 United States v. McCormick, 72 F.3d 1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995).
167 U.S. v. Pahlavi, 802 F.2d 1505, 1506 (4th Cir. 1986) (regarding 1-94 forms); U.S. v.
Quinteros, 769 F.2d 968, 970 (4th Cir. 1985) (regarding social security numbers).
168 U.S. v Castellanos, 165 F.3d 1129, 1130 (7th Cir. 1999).
169
170
171
1990).

18 U.S.C. § 1028(b) (2004).
42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) (2004).
U.S. v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Scott, 915 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir.
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ties. Federal law enforcement officials
have used section 408 as statutory author72
ity to secure a search warrant.'
The felony provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 408 are particularly effective in charging
illegal aliens because the elements of proof are more flexible than those required
by 18 U.S.C. § 1028.17 Use of a false social security number on a non-federal
document, such as a local business license or credit card, is actionable. 7 4 Proof
that the defendant used the false number or card for financial gain is not required. 175 Each misrepresentation on a credit card, bank account application,
state driver's license, benefits application, or federal document relating to employment (Forms 1-9 or W-4) involves a separate set of predicate facts which may
each be charged as a separate felony. 17 6 Mere possession of a social security card
77
or number that does not belong to a defendant can establish felonious intent.'
IH.

LOCAL POLICE COMPLIANCE WITH FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS.

Part III discusses the interplay between the identification and detention by
local police of aliens who have violated federal immigration law, and the constitutional protections against arbitrary arrest accorded all persons in the United
States, regardless of immigration status. Whether at the hands of state or federal
officers, arrests and detentions are at a minimum subject to the Fourth Amendment. 1 78 The ability to recognize indicia of illegal alien status, and to understand
the links between such indicia and criminal violations of immigration and other
federal criminal law, is essential to establishing reasonable suspicion in the local
law enforcement context within constitutional bounds.
172 John K. Webb, Use of the Social Security Fraud Statute in the Battle Against Terrorism (42
U.S.C. § 408(a) (7) (A)-(C)), 50 U.S. Arr'vs' BULL. 1 (May 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/eousa/foiareading-room/usab5003.pdf.
173 U.S. v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that using a fraudulently obtained
social security number for identification purposes demonstrated a willful knowing intent to deceive);
U.S. v. Silva-Chavez, 888 F.2d 1481, 1482 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that the 'for any other purpose'
element was to be interpreted broadly); U.S. v. Means, 133 F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1998); U.S. v.
McCormick, 72 F.3d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995). But see U.S. v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1553-54 (1st Cir.
1989) (in which handing over a false social security card together with other personal effects collected
at time of arrest was not considered to be misuse of the card with "intent to deceive").
174 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(C) (2004).
175 Silva-Chavez, 888 F.2d at 1482.
176 U.S. v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Defendant may properly be charged
with committing the same offense more than once as long as each count depends on a different set of
predicate facts.").
177 U.S. v. Charles, 949 F. Supp 365-66 (D.V.I. 1996); U.S. v. Teitloff, 55 F.3d 391, 394 (8th Cir.
1995).
178 Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir 1983). But see discussion of U.S. v.
Esparza-Mendoza, infra, holding that Fourth Amendment does not apply to aliens reentering the U.S.
after removal.
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Reasonable Suspicion of Immigration Law Violations
Voluntary Encounter Context
A consensual encounter between a police officer and a private citizen does not
trigger the Fourth Amendment prohibition against a police seizure of a person
without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Most citizens will respond to
a police request. The fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are
179
free not to respond, does not eliminate the consensual nature of the response.
A consensual "encounter" only becomes an unlawful "seizure" when a reasonable person in the same circumstances would not feel free to leave.180 "Circumstances that might indicate a seizure include the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with
' 181
the officer's request would be compelled."
Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street, in public places, or on public conveyances, and putting questions to them, if they are
willing to listen. Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting
a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage-provided they do not induce cooperation by
coercive means.182 Where bus travelers were briefly detained by INS agents at a
scheduled rest stop and not otherwise delayed in their journey, a brief questioning regarding citizenship was a minimal intrusion on the bus travelers' privacy
interests, which was outweighed by the government's substantial interest in con183
trolling illegal immigration.
When a police officer approaches an individual and asks questions or requests
identification, no seizure occurs as long as the officer does not convey that compliance is required. 18 4 A state trooper who approached the driver of a van fueling at a highway truck stop, and who did not show his weapon or touch the driver,
but asked for a drivers license, vehicle registration, and insurance papers, was
found to have engaged in a consensual encounter, even though he had unsuccessfully used his flashing lights and loudspeaker in a show of force to ask the driver
185
of the van to pull over outside the truck stop.
179
180
103 F.3d
181
182
183
184
185

INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215-17 (1984).
U.S. v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Hathcock,
715, 718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127 (1997)).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2000).
U.S. v. Angulo-Guerrero, 328 F.3d 449, 453 (8th Cir. 2003) (concurring opinion).
Florida v. Bostick, 601 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991).
U.S. v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1998).
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During a consensual questioning, a respondent may claim to be a U.S. citizen,
lawful permanent resident, or to have some other immigration status authorizing
his or her presence in the United States. The former INS recommended that its
enforcement officers question a person as to citizenship status using a standard
format: "Of what country are you a citizen?" This awkward format requires the
respondent to demonstrate his or her understanding of the English language and
to make a "thoughtful" active response. 186 A mere response by itself is not conclusive. An officer in this circumstance may then ask to see the person's
documents.
United States v. Esparza-Mendoza
One recent case in Utah has held that aliens who have illegally reentered the
United States are not persons covered by Fourth Amendment protections.18 7 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that there had not been any Fourth Amendment
violation, so that there was no need to decide whether
the illegal alien was enti1 88
tled to protection under the Fourth Amendment.
In March 1997, Jorge Esparza-Mendoza, a Mexican citizen, illegally entered
the United States, and never legalized his status. In 1999, he was convicted of a
felony and deported to Mexico. He again illegally entered the United States, was
discovered by local police while they were investigating a domestic altercation
between two women, and was charged with illegal reentry. 89
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress his identification card, arguing that
he was detained and forced to present his identification card without probable
cause. The court denied the motion on the novel ground that, as a previously
removed alien felon, Esparza-Mendoza could not assert a violation of the Fourth
Amendment because he was not one of "the people" the Amendment protected
and did not have a "sufficient connection" to the United States. As a Mexican
citizen, the defendant had illegally entered the United States twice, and would' in
all probability be deported to Mexico again, upon his release from prison.
Esparza-Mendoza argued that he was detained and forced to present his identification without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The court agreed that
the defendant was detained for a brief period without reasonable suspicion, circumstances normally violative of Fourth Amendment rights. However, the underlying question was whether the defendant had the capacity to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim. District Judge Paul Cassell framed the issue as "whether the
disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect."
186
187
188
189

INS Inspector's Field Manual (IFM) § 12.3.
U.S. v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003).
U.S. v. Esparza-Mendoza, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 2004).
Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 at 1255.
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The application of the Fourth Amendment to previously removed aliens is unresolved in both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. Judge Cassell found
the 1990 Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez "most
instructive."' 9 0 The key to Verdugo-Urquidez was its formulation of the "sufficient connection" test. In that case, the Court considered a challenge by a Mexican resident to a search of his residence in Mexico by American law enforcement
officials. The Court declared: "While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment and by the
First and Second Amendment ...refers to a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
this country to be considered part of that community." 19'
Judge Cassell then examined the historical background in Anglo-American
common law regarding the attachment of alien felons to the political community.
He found that criminal aliens have not been considered part of, or connected to,
the nation's political community, and that historical materials proved that "the
Framers were doing everything possible to exclude such persons from the national community."' 192 Esparza-Mendoza was entitled to those rights that follow
from mere presence in this country, but lacked entitlement to those rights which
arise from being a member of the American society, including Fourth Amendment protections.
Judge Cassell further supported his conclusion with the doctrine that trespassers, who are found illegally on property, lack the right to raise Fourth Amendment challenges to searches of that property.1 93 He held that precisely the same
thing could be said of the defendant in this case, whom he characterized as being
1 94
a trespasser in this country.
The defendant argued that if the court excluded him from Fourth Amendment
protection, "police officers would go unchecked in their interactions with suspected illegal aliens." In response, the court noted the importance of not allowing
policy considerations to dictate its interpretation of constitutional provisions.
Judge Cassell nonetheless chose to address this concern "because of the importance of preventing police misconduct." The court held that the Fourth Amendment was not the sole constitutional restraint on police activity, since the Fifth
Amendment guaranteed "all persons" protection against deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

190
191

Id. at 1259, citing U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Id. at 1262, citing Verdugo-Urquidez at 265.

192
193
194

Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1271, citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978).
Id. at 1271.
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The District Court also held that the extension of the Fourth Amendment and
its exclusionary rule to aliens previously removed for criminal reasons would
a95
have the potential to interfere with the effectiveness of criminal sanctions.
The question of whether illegal aliens who have not been deported meet the
'sufficient connection test' was not before the court. However, Judge Cassell
noted that case law appears to recognize an ascending scale of rights for aliens,
and wrote that whether aliens who have not been previously deported are distinguishable from alien felons
who have been deported was a question to be ad196
dressed "another day."'

Terry Stop or Investigative Detention Context
State and local officers, like their federal counterparts, have authority to detain persons for a brief warrantless interrogation (or 'Terry stop') based upon
reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a violation of federal lawincluding federal immigration law. 1 9 7 An investigative detention is a seizure of
limited scope and duration. To be lawful:
(i) the officer's action must be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception; and
(ii) the scope of the detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.
Reasonable suspicion must exist at all198stages of the detention, but it need not be
based on the same facts throughout.
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and therefore must be "reasonable.' 199 A
stop is reasonable if it is based on either an observed traffic violation, or a reason20 0
able articulable suspicion that such a violation has occurred or is occurring.
Reasonable suspicion must1 have a "particularized and objective basis" for sus20
pecting criminal activity.
In a routine traffic stop, a local officer with "reasonable suspicion" can detain
an individual to ask a moderate number of questions intended to determine identity and obtain information that would confirm or dispel suspicions.2 °2 It is permissible in a determination of identity during a lawful stop to inquire, "Where are
20 3
you from?" to verify immigration status.
195
196
197
198
(1968).
199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 1271-73.
Id. at 1273.
Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 1987).
U.S. v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319, 1322 (10th Cir. 1998), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
U.S. v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995).
U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
Berkemeer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
Gomez v. State of Florida, 517 So. 2d 110, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11754 (1987).
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It is essential for local officers to remember that foreign appearance based on
ethnic characteristics or language can only be considered in combination with
other specific circumstances that the officer can describe in words. 20 4 For example, reasonable articulable suspicion existed where an Oklahoma state patrol officer asked occupants of a van whether they were "legal" based in part on their
ethnic appearance, where the vehicle had been stopped for an apparent seat belt
violation, and the occupants were first questioned about their travel plans and
asked what family or other relationships existed between the passengers.20 5
Observations made while investigating a traffic violation or other offense can
provide an independent basis for reasonable suspicion that either the driver or his
passengers have violated federal immigration laws, which would then permit further detention to investigate the immigration violations as part of the Terry stop
20 6
procedure.
Reasonable suspicion existed to temporarily detain and investigate the traveling companion of a person whom police suspected of illegal entry, where the
police could describe indications that both persons were acting in concert.20 7 Ina
routine traffic stop in South Dakota, a highway patrol officer who questioned a
vehicle passenger regarding his citizenship and immigration status did not violate
his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure when the
driver, who was a legal resident, had told the officer his passenger was not "legal. '' 20 8 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that even if the officer had
lacked reasonable suspicion to question the driver, evidence of alienage obtained
during the questioning could be used against the illegal alien passenger in a subsequent criminal case. 20 9
The identity of an alien in a criminal or removal proceeding is not a constitutionally protected privacy right, nor suppressible as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. 2 10 An illegal alien has no expectation of privacy from another person's
knowledge of his or her unlawful immigration status. The exclusionary rule,
which suppresses statements and other evidence obtained in an unlawful warrantless search or arrest, does not apply in deportation proceedings. Even if local
police first discover the identity of an illegal alien through an unlawful search or
arrest, it may still be used in a subsequent civil deportation proceeding.2 11
204 Meissner, D., INS memo HQQPS 50/19-P, Attachment A-7, May 22, 1998.
205 U.S. v. Favela-Favela, 41 Fed. Appx.185, 190 (10th Cir. unpub. 2002).
206 U.S. v. Wilson, 7 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1993).
207 U.S. v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1995).
208 U.S. v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 611-13 (8th Cir. 2001).
209 Id. at 616. Questioning a detained person regarding their immigration status does not require a particularized reasonable suspicion that the detainee has violated federal immigration law.
Muehler v. Mena, No. 03-1423, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2755 (Mar. 22, 2005).
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INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984).
U.S. v. Aldana-Roldan, 932 F. Supp 1455, 1456 (D. Fla. 1996).
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Unless state or local police have received firm and specific information that
federal authorities will not prosecute INA misdemeanors, they may impose investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion that an alien has not registered
with DHS, is not in possession of required registration documents, or has illegally
2 12
entered the United States.
United States v. Soto-Cervantes
A New Mexico case from the Tenth Circuit, where local police detained an
alien for investigation of immigration status when he presented an apparently
genuine (although subsequently determined to be invalid) alien registration document, illustrates how a federal court analyzed a police claim of reasonable suspicion of immigration law violations that arose during a street investigation of drug
2 13
activity.
Bernalillo County sheriffs' deputies properly detained a suspect based on indicia of illegal alien status after the original suspicion that the detainee was involved in drug activity was dispelled. First, several factors that did not
independently amount to reasonable suspicion justified the initial detention
under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis: (1) an anonymous tip (that drug
distribution was occurring on a street corner involving Mexican nationals and a
gray pick-up truck); (2) the officer's prior knowledge that drug activity had occurred in the surrounding area; and (3) the officer's observation of a group of five
individuals scattering behind a wall.2 14
No contraband or weapons were found on any of the individuals. When asked
for identification, two persons produced alien registration cards, two had no ID
documents, and a fifth stated that he was in the U.S. illegally. All suspects appeared nervous when questioned about identification. However, an NCIC check
on the defendant's alien registration card was negative for prior arrest history. 1 5
Despite the lack of evidence to further detain the defendant for state drug
violations, the Court of Appeals found that, based on three factors, reasonable
articulable suspicion still existed for a continued investigative detention while
INS agents were contacted to investigate federal immigration law violations: (1)
the officer's prior experience that approximately half of all alien registration
cards shown to him turned out to be fake; (2) the area of detention, which was
known to be frequented by Mexican illegal aliens; and (3) the nervousness of the
defendant when asked for identification.2 16
212 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion for the U.S.
Att'y. Southern Dist. of California, Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal
Aliens (Feb. 5, 1996).
213 U.S. v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 853 (1998).
214 Id. at 1323.
215 Id. at 1321.
216 Id. at 1323-24.
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The Court held that, while none of the factors alone could support a finding of
reasonable suspicion, the "totality of the circumstances" justified detention pending further investigation by INS agents even though the drug inquiries were complete. Under these circumstances, the fact that the documentation did not appear
to be obviously counterfeited did not prevent further detention until the INS
could make a more expert evaluation. The negative NCIC prior arrest report did
not require that officers let the suspect go, since the NCIC did not at that time
2 17
provide information concerning immigration status.
Upon arrival of the INS agent, further evidence was found which independently justified yet a third extension of investigative detention and a complete
verification of the detainee's immigration status: (1) a discrepancy between numbers on the front and back of the card; and (2) multiple issue dates on the card,
indicating that the alien might have been previously deported.2 18
Probable Cause for Detention or Arrest of Suspected Illegal Aliens
A local police officer's lack of knowledge of the immigration laws does not
preclude a court from finding that probable cause to detain an illegal alien existed. Probable cause for arrest is measured against an objective standard. 219 If
this objective test is met, it is unnecessary that a police officer also have a subjective belief that he has a basis for making the arrest.22 ° Probable cause exists
where the facts and circumstances within a police officer's trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant the belief of a man of reasonable
caution that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. 221 The fact that an officer lacks expertise in a particular field does not
mean probable cause is lacking, for lack of experience does not prevent a police
officer from "sensing the obvious." 222 Probable cause for detention on federal
charges may be established entirely by hearsay.2 23
A motorist's negative response to the question whether the motorist and passenger were "legal" during a lawful investigative stop established probable cause
to arrest the driver and passenger for a suspected violation of federal immigration
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1324.
219 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
220 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983); U.S. v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that the fact that an officer did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded on
a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose establishing custody by proving probable
cause).
221 U.S. v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1300 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
222 Id. at 1301 (citing U.S. v. Strahan, 674 F.2d 96, 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010
(1982).
223 Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b).
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law.2 2 4 Even where the local officer did not have a subjective belief in his own
mind that probable cause existed to arrest a suspect, the government may subsequently establish probable cause by identifying a suspect's statements or actions
that could have indicated a possible violation of federal immigration laws.
In a 1999 Utah traffic stop of illegal aliens (resulting in an arrest for cocaine
possession), a state trooper asked the suspects about their "travel plans., 225 The
suspects responded that they were coming from Mexico, and one passenger appeared to nod 'yes' when the officer then asked if they were "legal." Although
the officer was not aware that he had what the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
calls "the general authority to investigate and make arrests for violations of fedthat the arrest
eral immigration laws," and so testified at trial, the Court found
226
was lawful because probable cause existed as a matter of law.
Probable cause to arrest for alien-smuggling existed in a consensual encounter
at a rest-stop where the passengers in a van spoke no English, had no resident
alien cards, green cards, or passports, three of the passengers possessed unofficial
identification cards issued two days before in Arizona, and the alien driver stated
to a Nebraska state patrol officer that his passengers were from Mexico.22 7
Probable cause to establish that a person is in the United States in violation of
federal law can be established by the failure of an alien to produce alien registration documents, or the presentation of conflicting immigration documents.
When a person, during a consensual encounter in an urban bus station, disclosed to an undercover officer that he was not a citizen and that his "papers"
were at home in another state, reasonable suspicion existed that the alien had
committed an offense, and probable cause existed for his arrest.2 28
Presentation of conflicting immigration-related documents by a person of uninvestigation
confirmed identity encountered at business premises where an INS
229
was underway constituted probable cause to detain such person.
IV.

THE ALIEN DETENTION POWER OF LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

A perceived lack of authority to detain illegal aliens for pick-up by federal
immigration agents and difficulty in obtaining reimbursement for detention costs
have been common concerns for many local jurisdictions. The survey of federal
law and regulations in Part IV demonstrates that local police have more flexibil224 U.S. v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2001).
225 Questions about travel plans are routine, and may be asked as a matter of course without
exceeding the proper scope of a traffic stop. U.S. v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000).
226 Santana-Garcia,264 F.3d at 1193-94 (quoting from U.S. v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294,
1296, 1299, 1300 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999)).
227 U.S. v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1998).
228 State of Louisiana v. Nebar, 529 So. 2d 117 (La. 1988).
229 Yam Sang Kwai v. INS, 411 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969).
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ity than is generally understood to detain illegal aliens in custody under delegated
federal authority.
Detention of Illegal Aliens for Transfer to Federal Custody
An 'immigration hold' (or 'detainer') is an authorization made by an immigration officer to a state, county, or other local law enforcement agency, which requests the local agency to detain a person for U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement for possible future proceedings under the immigration laws. 230 An
immigration hold is an arrest without warrant made pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2). An immigration hold may only be authorized by a federal immigration officer, and only when the officer has determined that there is reason to
believe that the person to be held:
(i) is an alien;
(ii) is in the United States in violation of the immigration laws; and
2 31
(iii) is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.
Unless an alien has been granted voluntary departure pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(b), current federal regulations require that U.S. ICE make a determination within 48 hours of arrest as to whether:
(i) the alien will be "continued in custody" or "released on bond or recognizance"; and
(ii) a "Notice to Appear" or warrant of arrest will be issued.
However, "in the event of an emergency or other reasonable circumstance," a
custody determination may be made "within an additional reasonable period of

time. ,232
An alien detained solely on the basis of an immigration hold or other "statusbased" offense applicable only to aliens has not been arrested, and cannot invoke
the Speedy Trial Act,23 3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), or the procedural provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers,23 4 unless the detention was merely a ruse to retain custody of the alien pending a subsequent
indictment on a criminal charge arising from the same unlawful act.235

230

Classes of officers authorized to issue a detainer are listed in 8 CFR § 287.7(b).
231 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), INA § 287(a)(2)(2004).
232 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2004).
233 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (2004); U.S. v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 398-99 (1st Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 1073 (2001).
234 18 U.S.C. Appx.
235 U.S. v. Noel, 231 F.3d 833, 836-37 (11th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 356
(9th Cir. 1993).

THE CHIMERA AND THE COP

State Incarcerationof Undocumented Criminal Aliens
If "the chief executive officer" of a state or a political subdivision of a state
submits a written request to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Department
must either:
(i) enter into a contractual arrangement which provides for compensation to
the state or local government, as appropriate, with respect to the incarceration of "an undocumented criminal alien"; or
(ii) take the undocumented criminal alien into federal custody and incarcerate the alien.2 36
An "undocumented criminal alien" for purposes of this statute is an alien who
has committed two or more misdemeanors or a single felony, and also has:
(i) entered the U.S. without inspection (PWI);
(ii) been the subject of removal proceedings at the time of arrest (an absconder); or
(iii) been admitted as a nonimmigrant, but is out of status at the time of
arrest.237
of incarceration in the relevant
"Compensation" is defined as the average cost 238
state, as determined by the federal government.
During the ten-year period from enactment through fiscal year 2004, claims for
compensation have been limited by statute to funds appropriated by Congress, as
distributed by grants from the U.S. Department of Justice, and in practice have
only amounted to a fraction of the total costs incurred by cities and states.2 39
However, the statutory limitation against state or local claims against the
United States based on the availability of appropriations terminated on October
1, 2004.240 With the intervention of the local city or county executive, every police department now has the potential ability to transfer a detained alien who has
been convicted of a second misdemeanor into federal custody, or else claim 24com1
pensation at a per diem rate for continued incarceration in a local facility.
InstitutionalRemoval from Local and State Prisons
Historically, almost eighty percent of foreign-born prisoners turn out to be
removable criminal aliens. Based on this ratio, it was estimated in 1997 that about
236 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i)(1), INA § 241(i)(1) (2004), originally enacted as the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, § 20301 (1994), transferred by IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 §328(a)(1)(A) (1996).
237 INA § 241(i)(3) (2004).
238 INA § 241(i)(2) (2004).
239 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20301(a) (1994). See also 61 Fed. Reg. 38218 (July 23, 1996).
240 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20301(c) (1994).
241 California v. Dept. of Justice, 114 F.3d 1222, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE

DIsTmcr

OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

40,000 additional removable
criminal aliens enter U.S. federal, state, and local
242
prisons each year.
The Immigration and Nationality Act requires the Department of Homeland
Security to hold removal proceedings on site at some federal, state, and local
prisons and jails. DHS is also required to complete those removal proceedings,
"to the extent possible," before the alien finishes serving a criminal sentence for
an underlying aggravated felony. 243 This requirement is implemented through
the Institutional Removal Program (IRP).
Established under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the IRP
is a cooperative effort among U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, and federal and state correctional
agencies to identify removable aliens incarcerated in correctional institutions and
complete administrative removal proceedings before the end of an alien's sentence. The goal of immediate deportation at the time the alien's prison sentence
is completed promotes an efficient use of limited federal detention space, and
reduces threats to public safety by effecting immediate deportation upon completion of the alien's sentence. 2 "
The former INS was criticized for poor performance in locating removable
aliens in state, county, and municipal jails. 245 Although the IRP dates to 1986, it
operated on an ad hoc basis until 1994.
The IRP represents a significant opportunity for local and state corrections
agencies to achieve needed bed-space savings. The most significant obstacle for
the program from the local and state perspective was the failure of the former
INS to identify removable aliens and commence institutional removal proceed246
ings in an expeditious manner.
Legislation has been proposed in Congress to expand the program beyond its
present operation in states with the largest number of criminal aliens. Improvements in interagency data sharing should improve the process. The potential of
the program to excise alien felons and career criminals from local communities is
clear. However, in practice, state and local police contributions are limited to
improved screening of arriving prisoners. The capability of U.S. ICE to complete
242 CriminalImmigration Deportation ProgramOversight Hearing Before House Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 104th Cong. 7 (July 15, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Lamar Smith, Chairman House Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims), available at http://commdocs.
house.gov/committees/ udiciary/hju54765.000/hju54765.
243 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), INA § 238(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)(2004).
244 INS Fact Sheet, Sept. 22, 1999, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheetsl
removal.htm.
245 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL ALIENS: INS' ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO REMOVE IMPRISONED ALIENS CONTINUE TO NEED IMPROVEMENT (GAO/GGD-99-3) 4-6 (1998).
246 See, e.g., Criminal Immigration Deportation Program Oversight Hearing Before House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 104th Cong. (July 15, 1997) (state-

ment of Anthony J. Annucci, Dep. Comm'r. and Counsel, N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Services).
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institutional removal hearings prior to completion of the alien inmate's sentence
remains the de facto limit for programmatic success.
Transfer to Federal Custody of Illegal Aliens Arrested for
Controlled Substance Violations

The Department of Homeland Security is required to "effectively and expeditiously take custody" of an alien who has been "arrested" by a state or local law
enforcement official for:
a violation of any law relating to controlled substances, if the official

...

(1)

has reason to believe that the alien may not have been lawfully admitted to
the United States or otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States,
(2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or employee of [DHS] of
the arrest and facts concerning the status of the alien, and (3) requests
[DHS] to determine whether to issue a detainer.24 7
For purposes of this provision, "arrested" means the alien has been taken into
physical custody for a criminal violation, booked, charged, or otherwise officially
processed, and provided an initial appearance before a "judicial officer" and informed of the charges and the right to counsel.24 8
Temporary Local Detention of Criminal Aliens without
Bond under Federal Law

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 created a powerful detention provision that authorizes a state or local police officer to arrest any alien other than a legal permanent resident for a federal "offense," and to request a local magistrate to
temporarily detain the alien for up to ten days without bail while awaiting transfer into federal custody, so long as the alien is found to be a "flight risk" or
"danger to any other person or the community."
For any offense against the United States, the offender may, by any ...
mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where
the offender may be found, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned, or released as provided in ... [18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et
seq.], as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as
249
by law has cognizance of the offense.
The authority to make arrests for federal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 3041 extends to state and local law enforcement officers. 2 50 The arrest for a federal of247 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d), INA § 287(d) (2004).
248 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(d) (2004).
249 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (2004) (emphasis added).
250 U.S. v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that reference in statute to
mayor includes local police).
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fense must be within the arrest power granted to the police officer under state
law in his jurisdiction, including requirements for warrantless arrests. Thus the 18
U.S.C. § 3041 power extends to the federal immigration misdemeanor of illegal
entry only in states where police are authorized to arrest for federal misdemeanors in general. As a practical matter; use of this federal arrest power is particularly appropriate for immigration law enforcement where police have established
probable cause to arrest for violations of federal fraudulent document and false
statements laws, as well as for alien smuggling felonies or illegal reentry felonies.
"A judicial officer authorized to order the arrest of a person under section 3041... before whom an arrested person is brought shall order that
such person be released or detained, pending judicial proceedings," pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 99 3141-56.251 The judicial officer is normally a federal
magistrate, but the statute expressly provides for a determination of temporary detention to be made by a state official described in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3041.252
If the arrestee brought before the judicial officer is not a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)), and it is found that the alien may flee or pose a danger to
any other person or the community, the judicial officer may order that, pending
2 53
trial, the person may be temporarilydetained to permit deportationor exclusion.
In this circumstance, the judicial officer must ("shall") (1) order the detention
of the alien for a period of not more than ten days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
and holidays, and (2) direct the government attorney or representative to notify
the appropriate official of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Under § 3142(d), Congress intended to provide that it is reasonable to detain an
individual who is an alien and a flight risk-i.e., an illegal alien-for as long as
seventeen days without an arraignment or an indictment. 25 4 The alien for whom
detention is sought has the burden of proving to the court such person's U.S.
citizenship or lawful admission for permanent residence.2 55
An apparent advantage for the local agency of an arrest and charge under
federal statutes is that an alien detained in these circumstances is arrested and
imprisoned "at the expense of the United States."25 6
An illegal alien is an inherent flight risk. 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has
noted that the probability that a deportable criminal alien will abscond if released
251 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a) (2004).
252 See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a). However, a U.S. Marshal is not a judicial officer for Bail
Reform Act purposes.
253 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(a)(3), (d)(1)(B), and (d)(2) (2004).
254 U.S. v. Melendez, 55. F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 n.7 (D.P.R. 1999).
255 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (2004).
256 8 U.S.C. § 3041 (2004) (emphasis added).
257 Melendez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 110, n.6; U.S. v. Garcia-Ortiz, 310 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 2002).
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on bail is unacceptably high, in the range of twenty to twenty-five percent.25 8 For
example, after arrest on a charge of alien smuggling and assault on a federal
police officer, an illegal alien was properly held in temporary detention without a
bail hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d) where the illegal alien was a flight risk due
to lack of local family ties.259 An illegal alien facing both deportation and criminal charges with potential prison sentences over ten years could be detained without bail as a flight risk under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), notwithstanding the presence
of the alien's family and his ability to post bond based on local real property
collateral. 260 An alien who (1) entered the U.S. illegally, (2) possessed a fraudulent green card, and (3) faced a prison sentence for a drug offense followed by
261
deportation was deemed a flight risk justifying detention without bail.
The risk of flight for an illegal alien charged with reentry is "enormous," and
no "reasonable court" would release such a defendant on bail.26 2 An illegal
alien's familial ties to his native country are a factor increasing the risk of
flight.2 63 Even a permanent legal alien can be detained as a flight risk under
section 3142(e) where there has been an individualized determination that the
alien has "demonstrated a consistent disregard for the law," and the alien has
264
continuing ties and substantial assets in a foreign country.
An order of temporary detention for ten days under section 3142(d) does not
preclude a subsequent consideration of detention pending trial under section
3142(f) before the temporary detention period has expired. 265 Similarly, although it is better practice to hold the hearings under paragraph (d) of section
3142 on temporary detention pending U.S. ICE notification and the hearings
under paragraph (e) on detention pending trial due to flight risk, it is permissible
to make the two determinations separately or sequentially.26 6
PART V.

PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF A LOCAL IMMIGRATION
LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM

It is vital that local law enforcement agencies facing a significant influx of sus-.
pected illegal aliens follow certain general steps to insure that the purpose and
scope of any new enforcement activity is clearly understood in the community.
With careful planning and support, local government and law enforcement can
258 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518-20 (2003).
259 U.S. v. Mercedes, 154 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.P.R. 2001).
260 U.S. v. Delgado-Rodriguez, 840 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). See also U.S. v. MorandaRoman, 757 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
261 U.S. v. Perez, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4191 (10th Cir. 1993 unpub.).
262 Melendez, F. Supp. 2d at 109.
263 Id.
264 U.S. v. Martinez, No. 00cr10172-NG, at 10-11, 102 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2000).

265 U.S. v. Moncada-Pelaez, 810 F.2d 1008, 1010 (11th Cir. 1987).
266

U.S. v. Bercerra-Cobo, 790 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1986).
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play a role in the detection and apprehension of illegal aliens in a way that will
facilitate their removal by the federal government while avoiding communal con-

frontations. Planning is particularly important to avoid actions that could constitute unconstitutional discrimination against citizens and lawfully-present aliens
on the basis of national origin or foreign appearance. The following list is illustrative of a general sequence of planning actions that could be used to implement

a new immigration law enforcement program in a local jurisdiction:
1. Apply to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for certification and
training of designated local officers as local immigration law enforcement
officers under a Section 133 cooperative agreement. 267 While such formal measures are not obligatory, a 'Section 133' agreement can provide local officers with
federal liability protections and immunities when conducting warrantless investigations and detentions for civil violations of immigration law. Florida, South Carolina, and Alabama state law enforcement agencies have executed Section 133

agreements with DHS, with significant variations tailored to the perceived needs
and interests of the individual state.26 8

2. Undertake an initial impact assessment of the alien population in the local
jurisdiction. Contacts with other local government agencies, community, nonprofit and public service organizations, as well as the agency's own intelligence
sources, should be made to develop a best estimate of the size, distribution, and

profile of aliens, both legal and unauthorized, who are present in the jurisdiction.
Departmental records should be reviewed to identify locations where arrests of

persons who were subsequently identified as illegal aliens have clustered. Update
the database regularly, and brief patrol and supervisory officers on the key find-

ings. Knowledge of prior patterns of violations is an important element for establishing reasonable suspicion.
267 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), INA § 287(g) (2004). Upon approval of the cooperative agreement by
the Attorney General, the designated local officer becomes a limited federal immigration official.
The designated local officer is subject to the "direction and supervision of the Attorney General"
while performing the immigration enforcement function, and, if the written agreement so specifies,
may use federal property and facilities to accomplish that function. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(4)-(g)(5)
(2004). Before the federal government may accept the agreement, the Attorney General must
determine that the designated officer is qualified to perform the agreed-upon immigration function.
The agreement must require the designated officer to know and adhere to federal law relating to the
function, and must contain a written certification that the designated officer(s) "have received
adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g)(2) (2004). Additionally, the agreement must specify the officer's "powers and duties," "the
duration of the [officer's] authority" and the Department of Justice agency that will supervise and
direct the officer on behalf of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5) (2004).
268 For a description of the Florida and Alabama programs, see April McKenzie, A Nation of
Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State and Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws since 9/11, 55
ALA. L. REV. 1149, 1156-59 (2004).
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3. Keep the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement informed of all
activities, beginning in the planning stages. Discuss options to integrate the local
departmental plan with a QRT (Quick Response Team) program in the jurisdiction. U.S. ICE enforcement officers will appreciate and respond to a "value-added" approach that adds more in capability than it consumes in limited federal
resources.
4. Implement separate arrest and detention procedures for (1) illegal aliens
detained for state or federal criminal violations, and (2) illegal aliens who are
simply deportable. Removal (deportation) is a civil penalty, not criminal punishment. Illegal aliens who are only status violators should be detained separately
from criminal suspects, where possible. Alien status violators require separate
warnings from the standard Miranda warnings. Such aliens should be detained in
the least restrictive environment consistent with their inherent flight risk, until
they can be transferred to federal custody. Aliens detained for criminal violations, including the federal immigration crimes of illegal reentry, document fraud,
smuggling and harboring crimes, etc., can generally be processed using existing
criminal procedures.
Communication and coordination with the U.S. Attorney's office and the federal magistrate's office (including pretrial services personnel) responsible for the
local jurisdiction is also an essential activity.
5. Complete budget and legal program reviews with local government and
agency legal counsel. Ensure that the local government with jurisdiction over the
police department has planned for the costs associated with the detention of illegal aliens pending their transfer to federal custody, and taken steps to minimize
or shift such costs to the federal government.
6. Consider hiring a consultant to conduct in-house immigration enforcement
training, perhaps in a cooperative effort with other jurisdictions. Retired senior
Border Patrol and INS personnel are available at reasonable cost.
7. Ensure that the public is informed in advance of changes in enforcement
policy. If, as is often the case, the police department determines that the illegal
alien population in its community is largely composed of a dominant nationality,
creation of a communication strategy to inform this community is critical. A successful public information program will also have the effect of deterring illegal
aliens from remaining in the jurisdiction, which is the most cost-effective solution.
In contrast, a sudden, secret crackdown, no matter how well intentioned, will run
the risk of generating protests that can cripple a local program.
8. Raise awareness of the scope and impact of immigration-related crime
among local civic and community organizations concerned with public health,
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safety, and environmental issues. Publicize points of contact in the agency or
organization for community reporting and confidential whistleblowers. Help
community groups to educate the public to identify and report document fraud,
unauthorized employment, illegal uses of residential housing, and smuggling/harboring violations in their neighborhoods. In particular, provide the public with
materials that describe acceptable examples of indicia of immigration-related
crime, other than "looks foreign," "doesn't speak English," and other unacceptable national origin or racial profiling criteria.
9. Consider a transitional "warning" period for landlords and employers in the
community before moving to a full enforcement program. Notify these important
stakeholders of the unlawful presence of illegal aliens on their premises before
invoking U.S. ICE assistance. Notice also can establish prior criminal knowledge,
intent, and liability should prosecution become an option.
PART

V1.

POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST LOCAL ENFORCEMENT

According to the best accounts which I have been able to obtain, this
Chimera was nearly, if not quite, the ugliest and most poisonous creature,
and the strangest and unaccountablest,and the hardest to fight with, and the
most difficult to run away from, that ever came out of the earth's inside.
-Nathaniel

Hawthorne, Bellerophon and the Chimera (1852).

Since 9-11, organizations opposing immigration law enforcement have developed a critique of local enforcement of federal immigration law. Two common
2 69
themes are briefly discussed in Part VI.
Racial Profiling of Immigrant Communities
Opponents assert that attempts by local law enforcement agencies to enforce
immigration law have led to false arrests and civil rights violations of people who
269 Numerous extensive policy critiques of local enforcement are available in the legal literature. See, e.g., April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or A Nation of Suspects? State and Local
Enforcement of FederalImmigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA.L.REv. 1149, 1164-65 (2004) (local enforcement jeopardizes community policing, undocumented aliens are the wrong group to target);
David Coles, Enemy Aliens, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 953, 957 (2002) (treating citizens and non-citizens
differently as response to 9/11 is normatively and constitutionally wrong); Jill Keblawi, Immigration
Arrests by Local Police: Inherent Authority or Inherently Preempted?, 53 CATH. U.L. REV. 817, 846-47
(2004) (states should forbid local enforcement of civil immigration law); Marie A. Taylor, Immigration
Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 93 (2002) (INS and state ind local law enforcement
collaboration will almost certainly lead to racial and civil rights violations).
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look or sound foreign but who are lawfully present in the United States.27 ° Immigration law enforcement by local police officers is said to undermine trust between immigrant communities and the police. 27 1 The adoption of policies that
enable local police to act as de facto immigration agents are said to seriously
erode community police relations in immigrant communities. To obtain information on unforeseen terrorist threats, it is argued that local police must build ties
with immigrant communities that preclude enforcement of immigration law.272
At bottom, the profiling and community trust arguments represent a political
rejection of the broken windows theory of criminology, which holds that failure
to police small transgressions of social norms undermines the willingness of a
population to enforce social order and produces higher levels of crime and violence.27 3 Advocacy group claims that immigrant communities will naturally resent and resist enforcement of immigration law are anecdotal, and have never
been empirically verified.27 4
Discussion of illegal alien crime rates has become a political taboo. However,
evidence is growing that some local police departments have become so intimidated by rapid growth in the immigrant population that they are willing to ignore
the law and tolerate violence to avoid community unrest. An estimated ninetyfive percent of the 1,200 to 1,500 fugitives with outstanding warrants for homicide
in Los Angeles are illegal aliens. In 2003 an estimated two-thirds of approximately 17,000 felony warrants in Los Angeles were for illegal aliens. Police officers have estimated that seventy percent of the criminals in the Washington
Heights district of Manhattan are illegal aliens.2 75
Police department evidence also points to strategic planning by organized
criminal gangs to benefit from non-cooperation policies. For example, in Los Angeles a high percentage of Mexican and Central American criminal gang members are illegal aliens. Illegal alien runners, known as "border brothers" to police,
are reported to work off the debt incurred to the traffickers who smuggled them
into the United States through street sales of narcotics. Although police intelli270 See, e.g., Akram & Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 295, 303 (2002) (Arabs and
Muslims are 'racialized' immigrant groups subjected to 'demonization' by the federal government and
Jewish organizations).
271 AILA Issue Paper, State and Local Enforcement of FederalImmigration Law, updated Mar.
4, 2003.
272
273

CHISTI ET AL., AMERICA'S CHALLENGE, supra note 3, at 16.
See, e.g., Wilson & Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.

274 See, e.g., Anwar Iqbal, Muslim youths turned in by their own, UPI (Aug, 6, 2002) (reporting
that many of the hundreds of Muslims arrested in the United States since Sept. 11 for immigration
violations and suspected links to terrorist groups were turned in by their friends and relatives over
petty disputes), available at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StorylD=20020806-015713-9252r.
275 Heather MacDonald, The Illegal-Alien Crime Wave, 14 CITY JOURNAL 1 (2004), available at
http://www.city-journal.orghtml/14-1-the-illegal-alien.html.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

gence officers claim to know the immigration status of many of these street

criminals, they are prohibited by Los Angeles Special Order 40, enacted in 1979,
from arresting gang members on immigration violations, and may not notify the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement about illegal aliens arrested for misdemeanors or ordinance violations. In practice, the ban extends to deported
aliens who have illegally reentered the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326.276 There appears to be a direct relationship between the percentage of
illegal aliens in a given police jurisdiction and the level of crime. Non-cooperation
policies strip away the ability of local police to remove alien felons from the community, leaving them free to engage in criminal occupations and prey upon citizens and legal aliens.
Local Police Lack the Experience and Training to Enforce
FederalImmigration Law

Opponents argue that federal immigration law is a complicated body of law
that requires extensive training and expertise to properly enforce, because there
are many different ways for people to be lawfully present in the United States
and the federal government issues many different types of documents that entitle
such lawful presence.2 77
Supporters of local law enforcement would respond that the identification and
initial detention of immigration law violators is based on relatively simple legal
concepts. "Arrest is the easy part.",278 The arresting officer must make a two-part
determination: first that the person is an alien; and second that the alien is subject
to removal from the United States. Neither determination is inherently more
complex or difficult for a trained law enforcement officer than the comparable
determination of the identity and status of a suspected domestic violator or absconder. Local police departments in practice provide more extensive training
and oversight of civil rights issues than does U.S. CIS or the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (BCBP), because local police are subject to greater criminal and civil liability for civil rights violations.
The former INS, now Department of Homeland Security, is required by the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) to respond to inquiries by federal, state, and local government agencies
seeking to verify or determine the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any lawful purpose.2 79
276 Id.
277 AILA Issue Paper, State and Local Enforcement of FederalImmigration Law, updated Mar.
4, 2003.
278 Interview with James Dorcy, INS (re'td.), President, FAIR Law Enforcement Advisory
Council (Dec. 2003).
279 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) IIRAIRA § 642(c) (2004).
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One enforcement-oriented verification resource whose availability and use by
local and state police has "skyrocketed" since September 11, 2001 is the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). LESC is
described as a national enforcement operations and intelligence center that gathers information from eight DHS databases,2 8 ° the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC), the Interstate Identification Index (III) and other state criminal
history indices. 281 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement claims that local
police callers to LESC can receive an initial analysis of an individual's immigration status within ten minutes.2 82
In contrast, the aspects of immigration law dealing with eligibility for a visa or
other form of admission to the United States, adjustment of immigration status,
and relief from removal are not only complex, but also arguably lack internal
consistency and coherence. Local law enforcement agencies do not participate in
these more complex areas of immigration law.
PART

VII.

THE CONCERNS OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

Federal law enforcement officers have the primary responsibility for immigration law enforcement in the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress, as well as
exclusive responsibility for deportation and removal activities. From the federal
law enforcement officer's perspective, immigration enforcement is a four-step
process, for which the apprehension of the alien is only the first of three essential
steps. The second step is administrative processing of the apprehended alien, and
consists of documenting and narrating the cause for the arrest, and preparing
formal statements equivalent to a charge sheet in criminal law, identifying the
statute or regulation upon which a removal proceeding will be initiated.28 3 The

remaining steps, adjudication of the removal proceeding and the final physical
deportation action, are exclusively the responsibility of the federal government.
280 Including former INS, Customs, and Federal Protective Service databases, and the SEVIS,
NSEERS and US VISIT databases developed by DHS.
281 "In FY 2002, the LESC received 426,895 law-enforcement inquiries. These included
309,489 from state and local law enforcement, 24,646 inquiries regarding foreign nationals seeking to
purchase firearms, and 24,646 investigative inquiries. The LESC lodged 2,112 detainers for the detention of unauthorized aliens. Additionally, the LESC processed 3,818 queries relating to NCIC hit
confirmation requests." Oversight Hearing on Departmentof Homeland Security Transition: Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Before House Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security
and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 12 (Apr. 10, 2003), (Statement of Asa
Hutchinson), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108thi/86409.PDF.
282 Press Statement of Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson, Homeland Security Supporting Local Law Enforcement Center (Aug. 19, 2003), text available at
http://www.immigration.com/newsletterl/lesehomet.html.
283 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a); 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2004).
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Resource Starvation and the Removal Chokepoint
The logistical and resource requirements created by federal deportation responsibilities must be considered when evaluating local agency immigration enforcement actions. The risk of operational gridlock due to "resource starvation"
in the detention and removal units is a major concern of federal immigration
officers.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement policy dating to the Clinton Administration directs that eighty percent of its available bed space in detention
centers must be reserved for mandatory detention of aliens. Priority is to be given
to arriving aliens in expedited removal proceedings, followed by all other aliens
in removals. Aliens with final orders of removal are the lowest priority.284 Nationwide, the Department of Homeland Security has only about 20,000 detention
"beds," while the number of absconders with orders of final removal is estimated
at 400,000 to 500,000, and the population of removable illegal aliens at nine to
eleven million.285 DHS thus lacks the dedicated funding and deportation personnel to handle any significant increase in detentions by local law enforcement. The
rate at which the Department of Homeland Security can accept the transfer of
immigration law violators from local to federal custody is thus determined by the
physical capability of the Detention and Removal Division of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to detain and deport aliens with final orders of
removal.
In the case of aliens who are nationals of foreign countries contiguous to the
United States,2 86 including Mexico, Canada and adjacent island nations,28 7 the
alien may request administrative voluntary departure in lieu of formal proceedings. 288 The processing officer under most circumstances is authorized to administratively offer voluntary departure, allowing the alien to return to his or her
home country without extensive detention or delay.289 Most apprehensions
284 INS Exec. Assoc. Cmm'r. Michael Pearson, Detention Guidelines (Oct. 7, 1998), reproduced
at 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1508 (Nov. 2, 1998).
285 Michael Garcia, Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Balancing the Needs of Openness
and Homeland Security, Address at the Heritage Foundation, July 23, 2003, available at http://www.
ice.gov/graphics/news/testimonies/st030723.pdf.
286 A foreign contiguous territory shares a common boundary with the United States. 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.25(2) (2004).
287 Adjacent islands are St. Pierre and Miquelon, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, the Windward and Leeward Islands, Trinidad, Martinique, and other
British, French, and Netherlands territory or possessions in or bordering on the Caribbean Sea. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(5), INA §101(b)(5) (2004).
288 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2004); 8 C.F.R. § 240.25 (2004).
289 Administrative voluntary departure (also described as departure "under threat of deportation") occurs with the permission of the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] in
lieu of removal proceedings. The alien leaves with the knowledge that he does so in lieu of being
placed in proceedings. Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2003).
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made by the Border Patrol along and near the border result in administrative
voluntary departure.
Aliens from contiguous countries apprehended in the interior of the country
can also be offered administrative voluntary departure and be transported directly to the border from the interior. In practice, aliens apprehended in the
interior are commonly released "on their honor" to voluntarily return home, due
to a lack of appropriated funds and the resulting lack of government-paid transportation. Immigration officers believe that very few of these aliens ever voluntarily depart the United States.
Aliens who do not come from contiguous countries (perhaps fifty percent of
aliens residing illegally in the United States) must be detained and appear before
an immigration judge. 29 Constitutionally, an alien detained during a removal
proceeding who has not been determined to be a criminal alien or terrorist may
be released on bond. 291 The bond amount may be set by the detaining authority
or by an immigration judge. If the detained alien can post the bond amount, a
hearing date will be set, and the alien ordered to appear on that date.
In order for an appearance bond system to work effectively, the alternative of
detention must be available. Often, a shortage of detention bed space due to
insufficient appropriated resources leaves U.S. ICE no alternative but to release
the alien without a money bail on his or her own recognizance (OR), trusting the
alien to appear for a hearing. Not surprisingly, rates of failure to appear at removal proceedings for both cash-bonded and OR-bonded aliens are very high.
Provided that the alien actually appears for a hearing, and that the immigration judge finds that the government has sustained its case for removal, the alien
would normally be ordered removed, or possibly granted voluntary departure.
If the alien is detained at the time the order is given, it would not seem to be
too complicated for the government to execute the removal. In practice, appeal
by the alien and the continual lack of resources places physical limits on removal
operations. Long-term detention is both extremely costly and constitutionally disfavored, and the right to habeas corpus applies just as much to detained aliens as
it does to detained citizens. 292 In practice, a very high proportion of aliens who
have had hearings tend to wind up back out in the community. When their cases
are weak or hopeless, they tend to disappear into the underworld of immigrant
enclaves.
Finally, there remains the physical deportation from the United States of
aliens with a final order of removal. For aliens granted voluntary departure who
remain in custody of the government from time of apprehension until arrival at
290
(2004).
291
292

The alien executes Form 1-274, and is removed "under safeguards." 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(b)
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), INA § 236(a)(1) (2004).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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the border, the process is simple. The alien is escorted across the border and the
departure is witnessed by an immigration officer. The alien is then, of course, free
to turn around and promptly attempt another illegal entry from Mexico or, to a
lesser degree, Canada.
Aliens from noncontiguous countries with final orders of removal are an entirely different matter.2 93 Two major practical impediments to prompt physical
removal are determination of the country of deportation, including obtaining
travel documents for the alien, and the lack of resources required for transportation. An alien in a removal proceeding is entitled to designate a preferred country of deportation, and must be assisted in making application for travel or
departure documents.2 9" Verification of the alien's nationality and issuance of
travel documents can be a time-consuming process, during which the alien will
typically remain in custody at DHS expense. Dilatory tactics by the alien are
common.
Most aliens do not have funds or refuse to use their personal funds to purchase
their transportation back home. The government must purchase a one-way ticket
to the home country. Many transportation companies will not allow aliens being
deported to board their aircraft unless they are escorted by an immigration officer. Often, in the case of aliens with a potential for violence, more than one
escort is necessary, raising the cost of transportation and lodging for the alien and

multiple escorts.
The costs of physical removal for even a single such alien can be
29 5
enormous.
The perennial failure of Congress to appropriate sufficient resources to the
immigration enforcement branch responsible for detention and removal leaves
the system unable to meet its unfunded mandates. As a result, hundreds of
thousands of aliens ordered removed remain at liberty within the borders of the
United States.29 6 This "let them go culture" of federal immigration authorities
has been fiercely criticized by supporters of local enforcement policies.2 97 Yet,
even if all absconders were identified and detained by local police, the Border
Patrol, or other immigration officers, the Department of Homeland Security has
been left with little choice but to turn them loose. The lack of resources commit293 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1231; 8 C.F.R. § 241 (2004).
294 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2), INA § 241(b)(2), (2004).
295 Telephone interview with James Dorcy, INS (re'td.), President, FAIR Law Enforcement
Advisory Council (Dec. 2003).
296 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) News Release, July 2, 2004, available at
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/newsreleases/articles/070204dro.htm, (ICE has a 10-year strategic
national initiative focused on locating, apprehending, and removing more than 400,000 absconders,
which includes 80,000 criminal fugitive aliens with outstanding final orders of removal who are hiding
in the United States).
297 See, e.g., Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws, Hearing on H.R. 2671 Before House
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (Oct. 1, 2003) (testimony of James R. Edwards Jr., Hudson Institute).
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ted to detention and removal creates a bottleneck that will only worsen as the
other three steps in the enforcement process become more effective and efficient.
Voluntary Departure as a Condition of Plea Bargains in State
and Local Criminal Cases
Congressional action to allow state or local judges to conduct removal proceedings as part of the sentencing process for alien criminal offenders has been
proposed as an efficient partial solution to the removal bottleneck.2 98 The existing two-track system of separate removal and state criminal proceedings creates an enormous duplication of effort. Sentencing decisions and deportation
decisions often turn on the same events and the same equitable factors. Time
spent in federal detention is the most costly component of the mismatch between
the criminal and immigration enforcement systems.299

A federal criminal provision dating to 1976 authorizes deportation as a condition of supervised release. 300 As amended by the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act,
the provision stated that "[i]f an alien is subject to deportation, the court may
provide that he be deported and remain outside the United States, and may order
that he be delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for such deportation., 30 1 However, conflicts between federal circuit courts on the scope of the
statute, and the reluctance of the former INS to relinquish control over the deportation process, have effectively relegated this judicial power to the status of an
unused appendage. 302
In 1994 Congress again amended the INA to explicitly grant federal courts
jurisdiction to issue removal orders.30 3 In 1996 Congress expanded this authority
by repealing a previous limitation that judicial orders could only be entered
against aliens deportable for crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies. The INA now provides that a federal district judge may enter a removal
order "at the time of sentencing against an alien who is deportable. ' '304 How298

See Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge As Immigration Judge,

51 EMORY L.J. 1131 (2002); Martin Arms, Judicial Deportation Under 18 USC § 3583(d): A Partial
Solution to Immigration Woes?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1997).

299 Taylor & Wright, supra note 298, at 1138.
300 18 U.S.C. § 4212 (1976) [repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2027 (1984)].
301 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837-2034 (1984).
302 Compare U.S. v. Kassar, 47 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Xiang, 77 F.3d 771 (4th Cir.
1996); U.S. v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 1995); and U.S. v. Phommachanh, 91 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding no judicial deportation, only delivery of alien to INA upon supervised release); with
U.S. v. Oboh, 92 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding statute authorizes judicial order of deportation).
303 Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 224,
108 Stat. 4305, 4322.
304 Codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1), INA § 238(c)(1) (2004).
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ever, former INS again reacted cautiously. As a consequence, use of the new
authority has been limited.3 °5
Considering the institutional resistance to judicial deportation, a more practical legislative approach that would support federal-local cooperation would be to
authorize state courts to negotiate a 'supervised' voluntary departure agreement
as part of a plea bargain in a state criminal case.
Detention and removal is already mandatory for aliens convicted of the most
serious of the state crimes classified as aggravated felonies.3 °6 A state voluntary
departure statute would thus be directed at the many minor criminal offenses
committed by illegal aliens tried in state courts that are not aggravated felonies,
but which nonetheless require significant expenditure of state or local judicial
and correctional resources.
Sentencing judges could authorize an order of voluntary departure subject to
several conditions unique to the state and local contexts. First, there must be a
requirement that the voluntary departure order be filed with U.S. ICE, who
would need to retain a veto power to prevent abuses by criminal alien felons.
Second, the state or local jurisdiction that negotiated the plea bargain should be
required to physically escort the alien into the custody of U.S. ICE at an international port of departure. The cost of such transportation would be more than
offset by the direct savings in incarceration costs and the indirect benefit of removing habitual petty criminal aliens from the jurisdiction.
Criminalization of Immigration Status Violations

In an attempt to cut what is often seen as a legal Gordian knot, legislation has
30 7
been introduced in both houses of Congress to criminalize illegal presence.
The sponsors propose the enactment of a new section 275A to the Immigration
and Nationality Act that would make it a federal felony for an alien to be "present in the United States" in violation of the INA. By increasing the term of
imprisonment from six months to one year, these measures would increase the
penalty for the first commission of a crime of illegal entry under section 275(a) of
INA from a misdemeanor to a felony. 30 8 The apparent intent of the legislation is
to routinely charge many or most apprehended illegal aliens under this provision.
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement operates a deliberately
simple deportation system, streamlined to permit the quick resolution of very
305 Memorandum from Comm'r Doris Meissner to INS District Directors, Guidance re: Judicial Orders of Deportation (Feb. 22, 1995), reprinted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 449, at 462 (1995).
306 8 U.S.C. § 1228, INA § 238 (2004).
307 Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of 2003, H.R. 2671,
108th Cong. § 103; "Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HESA) of 2003. S. 1906, 108th Cong.
§ 103.
308 Both bills would also make the assets of any such alien subject to federal criminal forfeiture
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large numbers of deportation actions. 30 9 The former INS rarely used the criminal
illegal entry provisions of section 275 of INA because of a lack of resources.
Each alien charged with a federal crime must, inter alia, be "Miranda-ized," provided legal counsel by the federal public defender's office, and given a prompt
bail hearing. The civil immigration enforcement provisions have been used to
avoid that dilemma.
A more effective approach would be to focus on documents rather than "presence." The current federal scheme requires virtually every alien to register no
later than thirty days after entry, carry registration documents on his or her person, and, beginning in fiscal year 2005, to record both their entry and exit to and
from the U.S through the US VISIT system. 310 US VISIT is a document and
database-driven system. Once reasonable suspicion to 'stop' an individual has
been established during the officer's routine duties, it would be much more efficient for local police to determine whether or not the temporarily detained alien
possesses a required valid registration document, rather than attempting to develop probable cause to arrest the alien for an immigration crime whose primary
element is one or more violations of immigration status or illegal entry that, by
definition, have occurred outside of the presence of the local officer.
An amendment to raise the existing misdemeanor-level penalties in Immigration and Nationality Act Title II Chapter 7 (Registration of Aliens) for willful
failure to register, or for willful failure to carry a registration document on the
person, up to the one-year felony level, being proposed for an "illegal presence"
offense under section 275 of INA, would be a practical and constitutional approach. Failure to register after entry without inspection should also be criminalized at the same level, but without the "willful" element, as criminal intent, in this
circumstance, is demonstrable by the act itself.
The primary advantage of a document-driven enforcement system is that it
shifts the initial burden of proof of compliance with federal immigration law from
the local police officer to the alien, and sets the clearest possible bright-line rule
as to what constitutes a criminal violation. Assuming that a request for identification documents occurred within the limitations of a consensual encounter or lawful temporary police stop, the local officer would need only to confirm (1) that
the alien possessed a valid document, (2) if a reasonable doubt existed, whether
the document was genuine, and (3) whether evidence indicated that the violation
was not inadvertent, for example by a legal alien who merely forgot his document
at home.
309 U.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1984).
310 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1306 (2004); see generally United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program ("US-VISIT") Authority to Collect Biometric Data From Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, DHS Interim
Rule, 69 FR 53318 (Aug. 31, 2004).
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The only inquiry by police into personal status or history prior to a determination that probable cause existed to detain the alien would be whether the person
was a United States citizen. A false claim to citizenship is a felony, and in practice
the great majority of illegal aliens understand the consequences and are reluctant
to lie about citizenship status. 311 By contrast, making "illegal presence" a felony,
with the intention of using it as a routine enforcement tool, would require the
officer to engage in risky behavior, raising many of the privacy, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment concerns that animate opponents of local enforcement on
both the right and left.
ProsecutorialDiscretion

A final concern is the difficulty police departments face in reliably predicting
whether the federal government will initiate civil or even criminal proceedings
against aliens detained by the local force. The former INS had taken the position
that the 1996 illegal immigration reforms had given it increased prosecutorial discretion to commence removal proceedings under the exclusive jurisdiction provision of section 242(g) of INA, as a balance to other312provisions that "sharply
curtailed" discretion to grant relief from deportation.
In November 2000, outgoing INS Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a more
sweeping policy memorandum stating that the federal government has very broad
discretion to decline to enforce immigration law violations.3 13 The extent of this
doctrine, which has not been clarified by the current administration, represents a
significant practical limit to the ability of local law enforcement to remove identified illegal aliens from their jurisdiction.
Meissner defined the "favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion" as a discretionary decision not to assert the full scope of the INS' enforcement authority
as permitted under the law, and asserted that the former INS "exercises it every
day."' 314 Examples of this executive authority not to act included not initiating.
removal proceedings, not maintaining custody of an alien, and taking "other action in lieu of removing the alien." According to Meissner, the doctrine is so
deeply entrenched in federal administrative law that even a statute directing that
DHS "shall" remove removable aliens would not be construed to limit agency
311 18 U.S.C. § 911. See discussion in Part III, supra.
312 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See, e.g., letter from Ass't Att'y General Robert Ruben to Rep. Barney
Frank, Jan. 19. 2000, reprinted in 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 217 (Feb. 14, 2000).
313 Doris Meissner, Memorandum for Regional Directors, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion,
HQOPP 50/4 (Nov. 17, 2000), available at www.ilw.com. See also Paul W. Virtue, Restoring Fairness:
A Look at ProsecutorialDiscretion, 12 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 555 (June 15, 2000) (prosecutorial

discretion needed to ameliorate 1996 criminal deportation provisions); Memorandum of INS Gen'l.
Counsel Bo Cooper, INS Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, reprinted in 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES (2000).
314 Id. at 2.
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discretion. In contrast, Meissner concluded that where immigration law requires
"affirmative acts of approval or grants of benefits," such discretion does not in
theory exist. Prosecutorial discretion is constructed doctrine, distinct from the
exercise of statutory discretion in many benefit eligibility determinations.3 15
Meissner asserted that agency assessment of whether a "substantial federal
interest" is at stake controls whether discretion may be exercised. State interests
cannot be considered, because immigration is exclusively a federal responsibility,
and no adequate state law remedies are available. Therefore, investigations intended to identify a "high-priority" individual are to be "favored" over investigations that by their nature identify larger numbers of lower-priority ("a broader
variety") of removable aliens. Meissner specifically noted that even the removal
of criminal aliens from county jails, while formally a high priority, nonetheless
was suitable for exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Even where there was reason
and evidence to believe that an alien is removable, a decision to exercise enforcement alternatives "requires an individualized determination." Enforcement personnel in particular need "openness" to the knowledge3 16that the Service was not
legally required to institute proceedings in every case.
The expansive view of prosecutorial discretion that has arisen since 2000 represents an administrative attempt to reject the popular notion that the Department of Homeland Security has any ministerial obligation whatsoever to U.S.
citizens who are aggrieved by violations of immigration law. It is a perverse and
profoundly undemocratic permutation of the plenary doctrine. It stands in sharp
and ironic contrast to the position of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (BCIS) that many requests from an alien for adjudication of immigration
create enforceabenefits, described in almost contractual terms as "services," can 317
ble duties or obligations on the part of the federal government.
CONCLUSION

Bellerophon killed the Chimera, obeying the portents of the immortals.
-Homer,

Iliad 6.183.

There is a substantive, well-defined and functional body of federal statutory
and case law to support the independent enforcement of both criminal and civil
federal immigration law by local and state law enforcement officers, as well as a
much higher level of federal-local law enforcement cooperation than has existed
over the past generation.
315 Id. at 3.
316 Id. at 7.
317 "USCIS allows the DHS to improve the administration of benefits and immigration services
for applicants by exclusively focusing on immigration and citizenship services." http://uscis.gov/graph
ics/aboutus/thisisimm/index.htm.
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The objections to local enforcement and increased federal-local cooperation
are not well grounded in any significant jurisprudence, but are instead essentially
political in nature. Those interests who favor greatly expanded immigration in
general also oppose enforcement of existing laws against illegal immigration.
Cooperative federal-local enforcement programs, based on alien registration
and other documentary control systems applicable only to non-citizens, offer the
most effective and nondiscriminatory means of detection and control of aliens
unlawfully present in the United States.
The real practical limits on local enforcement remain the fiscal and operational
shortfalls in federal detention and removal programs. Congress could choose to
further devolve statutory plenary power onto local and state police. But until the
federal government adequately funds the federal removal process, the chimera
will continue to devour citizens and aliens alike, and the heroes in blue will be
fighting in a labyrinth of dead ends, not on a fair or just field of law.

